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Abstract 
 
Because uncertainty is high in bad times, investors find it harder to assess firm prospects and hence 
should value analyst output more. However, higher uncertainty makes analysts’ tasks harder, so it is 
unclear whether analyst output is more valuable in bad times. We find that in bad times, analyst revisions 
have a larger stock-price impact, earnings forecast errors per unit of uncertainty fall, and analyst reports 
are more frequent and longer. The increased impact of analysts is also more pronounced for harder-to-
value firms. These results are consistent with analysts working harder and investors relying more on 
analysts in bad times.  
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While there is a large literature on sell-side analysts’ role as information intermediaries, this literature mostly 
ignores the question of whether the state of the economy affects the value of analyst output for investors.1 There 
are good reasons to believe that the usefulness and performance of sell-side analysts depend on the state of the 
economy. It is well known that in bad times such as recessions and crises, there is greater variation in outcomes 
across firms and over time (see, for instance, Bloom (2009)). To the extent that the role of analysts is to make 
sense of firms amidst increased macro uncertainty, they should be more important and hence should work harder 
in bad times. Increased uncertainty, however, may make it more difficult for analysts to perform their job. 
Further, the decline in trading volume and hence broker profits in bad times may reduce performance rewards, 
leading to a decrease in analyst motivation. It is therefore not clear whether analyst output is more valuable in 
bad times than in good times. In this paper, we find that analysts are indeed more valuable in bad times: the 
stock-price impact of their recommendation and earnings forecast revisions is greater in bad times. We 
investigate possible explanations for this finding and conclude that the evidence is consistent with analysts 
working harder, and investors relying on analysts more in bad times. 
We conduct our investigation using a sample of I/B/E/S Detail earnings forecasts from 1983 to 2014 and 
recommendations from 1993 to 2014. We define bad times in several ways. The most obvious approach is to use 
prominent crises that have occurred during the sample period, such as the October 1987 crash, the LTCM crisis 
of 1998, and the credit crisis of 2007 to 2009. We also define bad times as recessions marked by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and as high uncertainty periods in the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) 
policy uncertainty index (from www.policyuncertainty.com). Our measure of the value of analyst output is the 
price impact, which captures the extent to which analyst signals affect investors’ assessment of firm value and 
hence is a measure of analysts’ contribution to firms’ information environment. 
                                                            
1 For example, Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack (2017) show that stock prices 
react to the release of analyst recommendations and a drift follows afterwards. Loh and Stulz (2011) show that some 
recommendation changes lead to a large noticeable change in the firm’s stock price and that these recommendations can 
impact the firm’s information environment. Bradley et al. (2014) report that, compared to earnings announcements or 
company earnings guidance, recommendations are more likely to cause jumps in intraday stock prices. Others find that 
analyst coverage reduces information asymmetry and improves visibility (Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)), disciplines credit 
rating agencies (Fong et al. (2014)), and affects corporate policies (Derrien and Kecskés (2013)). 
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Using average two-day abnormal returns to stock recommendation changes, we find that the stock-price 
impact of analysts is greater during bad times for both downgrades and upgrades. Further, using the definition of 
influential recommendations as defined by Loh and Stulz (2011), who classify recommendation changes as 
influential if the stock-price reaction is statistically significant, we find that both upgrades and downgrades are 
more likely to be influential during bad times compared to good times. We also find that the market reacts more 
strongly to earnings forecast revisions during bad times. Our evidence of greater analyst impact during bad 
times is robust to controlling for firm and analyst characteristics, including analyst fixed effects. We conclude 
that analyst output is more useful for investors in bad times, in that it moves stock prices more. 
Notice that we focus on macro instead of firm-specific bad times. This is because macro bad times are 
economically important and are more likely to be exogenous to analysts. Prior studies such as Frankel, Kothari, 
and Weber (2006) and Loh and Stulz (2011) show that analysts are more informative when firm-level 
uncertainty is higher. While we already control for firm-level uncertainty, to ensure that it is macro uncertainty 
that drives our results, we conduct two sets of tests. First, we decompose a firm’s total stock return volatility into 
market, industry, and firm-specific components. We find that the increased impact of recommendation changes 
in times of high uncertainty is strongest when the market component is used to define high uncertainty. Second, 
we investigate whether the market simply reacts more to all types of firm news in bad times (e.g., Schmalz and 
Zhuk (2017) find that earnings announcement reactions are larger in recessions). Adapting the methodology in 
Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006), we regress a stock’s daily absolute returns on a comprehensive set of 
dummy variables that capture important firm news events, in particular, recommendation changes, reiterations, 
earnings announcements, earnings guidance, dividend announcements, and insider trades. Interacting these news 
dummies with an indicator for bad times, we find that not all firm news events are associated with a greater 
impact in bad times. Importantly, the market continues to react more to recommendation changes (and 
reiterations) in bad times after taking into account all other news events and their interactions with bad times. 
Our finding that analysts’ stock-price impact is greater in bad times is therefore novel and robust. 
We next find that analysts’ absolute forecast errors increase during bad times, which raises the question of 
how their output can have more of an impact on prices during these times. We show, however, that traditional 
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measures of analyst precision are not appropriate for comparing precision across good and bad times. Rather, a 
relevant measure of precision is one that takes into account the underlying uncertainty. In a simple Bayesian 
model, the extent to which a new signal changes investors’ priors depends on both the weight that investors put 
on the new signal and the weight that they put on their prior (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi (2009)). As the precision 
of the signal increases relative to the uncertainty associated with their prior, they put more weight on the signal. 
Hence, in bad times, investors put more weight on a signal from an analyst if the ratio of the precision of the 
signal to the uncertainty of the prior increases. Such an outcome could occur even if the precision of the signal is 
lower in bad times as long as the precision of the signal falls less than the increase in the uncertainty about the 
prior. Thus, we can think of a relevant measure of forecast error as a measure of forecast error per unit of 
underlying uncertainty.  
Using prior volatility to normalize absolute forecast errors, we find that this adjusted forecast precision 
actually increases during bad times (scaling by prior volatility is similar to the approach that we use to define 
influential recommendation changes). Importantly, however, the finding that analyst forecast precision increases 
when measured against the underlying uncertainty does not necessarily mean that analysts automatically become 
more useful to investors. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) show that the extent to which investors rely on public 
information depends on the precision of their private information. Thus, if analysts’ signals are public 
information, investors will rely less on analysts in bad times if investors themselves have better private 
information. 
We develop and test five possible, nonmutually exclusive, explanations for why analysts might have more 
of an impact in bad times. First, we examine an analyst reliance hypothesis that builds on Kacperczyk and Seru 
(2007). This hypothesis predicts that investors rely on analyst information more during bad times. During bad 
times, investors have to understand how the increase in macro uncertainty affects firm prospects. Because of the 
increase in macro uncertainty, possible outcomes are more extreme, which can have more of an impact on firms 
than during good times. We would therefore expect greater demand for analyst output that helps investors sort 
out the potential impact of macro shocks during bad times compared to good times. If investors already know 
much about a stock however, analysts will have less to contribute. Consequently, when analyst output is more 
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valuable, it will be particularly more valuable for more opaque stocks. The cross-sectional implication is that the 
extent to which analyst output becomes more valuable in bad times is inversely related to the quality of the 
information environment for a stock and, thus, the value of analyst output increases relatively more for stocks of 
more opaque firms in bad times. We define opaque stocks as stocks with no company guidance, low institutional 
ownership, high idiosyncratic risk, small size, no options traded, or low coverage. Consistent with this 
argument, we find that the increased impact of analysts in bad times is indeed higher for more opaque stocks.    
The analyst reliance hypothesis does not assume that analysts change what they do in bad times. Rather, it 
assumes that analysts become more important for investors because investors face challenges that they do not 
face in good times and analysts help them address these challenges. However, it is plausible that analysts change 
what they do during bad times. The next three hypotheses pertain to possible changes in analyst output in bad 
times.  
Our second possible explanation for the increased impact of analysts in bad times is that analysts work 
harder in bad times due to career concerns. Glode (2011) argues that the better performance of mutual funds in 
bad times is due to investment managers working harder to produce better payoffs because investors have higher 
marginal utility in bad times. If the increase in uncertainty in bad times leads investors to value analyst signals 
more, analysts might also work harder to produce better signals in bad times.2 If, however, rewards for better 
analyst performance are limited in bad times as a result of the reduction in the profits of analysts’ employers and 
in turn in analysts’ bonus pools, analysts may work less hard in bad times. Thus, there is no clear empirical 
prediction as to whether analysts work harder in bad times. We find that the stock-volatility-adjusted precision 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts increases during bad times. This implies that analysts work harder to produce 
better forecasts in bad times. Consistent with this view, we find that analysts revise their earnings forecasts more 
frequently and write longer reports in bad times. Further, we find that analysts are more likely to leave the 
I/B/E/S database during bad times—this attrition risk could increase analysts’ incentives to work harder during 
                                                            
2 This channel is less direct for analysts compared to fund managers. Investors can reward good fund managers directly 
with more inflows or less outflows. In contrast, investors can reward good analysts only indirectly through the analyst 
reputation channel.  
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bad times. Since analysts produce better output in industries with more analyst competition (Merkley, Michaely, 
and Pacelli (2017)), we also expect analysts to work harder in industries with more analyst competition in bad 
times, with their impact increasing more in such industries. We find strong supportive results in the case of 
downgrades.  
The third possible explanation for the increased impact of analysts in bad times considers whether analysts 
use different skills in bad times. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) find that mutual fund 
managers display more market-timing skills than stock-picking skills during bad times. It is not clear whether 
analysts also produce more sector/macro information in bad times that is common across firms when such 
information is more valued by investors. To address this question, we examine whether a recommendation 
revision on a single firm impacts peer firms. Such a spillover effect might occur if part of the information in the 
revision reflects the analyst’s forecast of the common factor. We find some evidence that the spillover effect of 
downgrades on peer firms is larger in bad times than in good times; there is no difference for upgrades. Hence 
part of the increased influence of analysts in bad times, particularly with respect to downgrades, might come 
from an increased effort to collect and distribute negative macro/sector information. 
Fourth, there has been much work on potential analyst conflicts of interests (for a review of some of the 
evidence, see Mehran and Stulz (2007)). If analyst conflicts from investment banking are less important in bad 
times because of lower deal flow, analyst output might become less distorted and in turn more valuable. To test 
this prediction, we examine whether forecast bias (i.e., the signed forecast error) is different in bad times from in 
good times. If conflicts have less bite in bad times, analysts might be less optimistic in bad times than in good 
times. We find little support for this hypothesis as the forecast bias is either no different or more optimistic in 
bad times. We also explore whether the increased impact of analysts in bad times is related to the type of broker 
the analyst works for. We find that the increased influence of analysts in bad times generally holds for both 
independent brokers and brokers with investment banking business. Overall, we do not find evidence consistent 
with the conflicts of interest hypothesis. 
Our fifth and final potential explanation for the increased impact of analysts in bad times is that it has 
nothing to do with analyst output per se but rather is a result of overreaction by investors. Overreaction could be 
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more likely in bad times due to lower liquidity, so that trading on analyst revisions causes temporary price 
pressure when liquidity providers are less able to accommodate the order flow. Alternatively, arbitrageurs might 
be more constrained in bad times, so that they cannot counteract overreaction by some investors as effectively as 
in good times. To examine this possibility, we investigate whether the stock-price drift after revisions differs in 
bad times compared to good times and we find very little difference. Importantly, the stock-price drift after 
revisions does not exhibit reversals in good or bad times. Hence, overreaction cannot explain our results.  
Our paper is not the first to make the point that economic agents find signals more valuable in bad times. 
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016, p. 586) derive such a result for skilled fund managers, 
i.e., managers who have access to valuable signals. They argue that “[b]ecause aggregate risk factor payoffs are 
more uncertain in recessions […], recessions are times when information is more valuable.” In their model, fund 
managers allocate more attention to aggregate shocks in bad times because of the increase in aggregate 
uncertainty. Since the risk premium is higher in bad times, skilled managers’ greater attention to aggregate 
shocks in bad times leads them to perform better in bad times. In good times, when aggregate uncertainty is 
lower and the risk premium is lower, fund managers focus more on stock picking and pay more attention to 
signals about individual stocks. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) find empirical support 
for their prediction that skilled managers are better at market timing in bad times and at stock selection in good 
times.  
A few prior papers examine how crises affect analyst output. However, none of them test the hypotheses 
that we focus on here or are as comprehensive in showing that analysts are more influential in bad times and 
showing that it is the macro nature of bad times that matters. Arand and Kerl (2012) examine analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and recommendations around the credit crisis and find that, although forecast accuracy dropped, 
investors continued to react to revisions in recommendations. Kretzmann, Maaz, and Pucker (2015) find that 
recommendations have a larger impact in recessions than in boom periods but buy recommendations do not 
predict future stock returns in recessions. Amiram et al. (2017) examine analyst forecast timeliness during 
periods of high market uncertainty and find that analysts are less timely and underreact to news in these periods. 
However, investors still respond to forecasts in these periods even though these forecasts are more inaccurate. 
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Hope and Kang (2005) also find that forecast errors are higher in bad times. While most of these papers 
conclude that investors incorrectly pay attention to analysts who appear more inaccurate in bad times, we show 
that, controlling for the underlying level of uncertainty, analysts are actually more precise in bad times and 
investors correctly react more strongly to analyst revisions in these periods. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section I summarizes the hypotheses that we test. Section II 
describes our sample and reports our main result, that analysts’ impact is more pronounced in bad times. Section 
III reports results of several robustness tests. Section IV examines how forecast precision differs in good and 
bad times using different measures to scale forecast errors. Section V investigates potential explanations for the 
greater impact of analyst output in bad times. Section VI concludes.  
 I. Hypotheses 
We examine whether the stock-price impact of analyst revisions differs across good and bad times. Below, 
we develop three hypotheses predicting why analysts might have less of an impact in bad times, and five 
hypotheses predicting why analysts might have more of an impact in bad times.  
 A. Why Analysts Might Have Less of an Impact in Bad Times 
A.1. Difficult Environment Hypothesis  
In bad times, the forecasting environment is more difficult, which makes it harder for analysts to make 
accurate forecasts. Consistent with this view, Jacob (1997), Chopra (1998), and Hope and Kang (2005) find that 
earnings forecasts are less accurate during bad times. This hypothesis thus predicts that analyst revisions have a 
smaller stock-price impact in bad times due to greater forecast inaccuracy.  
A.2. Shirking Hypothesis  
Investment banking deal flow, equity market capitalization, and trading volume shrink in bad times, which 
can reduce brokerage business profits and in turn the bonus pool for analysts. Facing fewer rewards for good 
performance, analysts might be less motivated to provide quality research in bad times. Moreover, the greater 
amount of noise in the information environment can provide cover for poorer-performing analysts, making their 
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lack of effort or skill less noticeable. This hypothesis thus predicts less accurate forecasts and less impactful 
revisions in bad times due to increased incentives to shirk. This argument is similar to that in Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2001), who describe the difficulty that investors have in evaluating manager quality when firm 
performance is reduced by poor macroeconomic conditions.  
A.3. Inattention Hypothesis  
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) show that when a lot of news hits the market, investors tend to react less 
to firm news events. In bad times, information uncertainty increases, and hence there is a lot more news to 
digest. This hypothesis predicts that the stock-price impact of analyst revisions is lower in bad times due to 
distracted investors underreacting to analyst revisions.  
 B. Why Analysts Might Have More of an Impact in Bad Times 
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016) show that information about payoffs with a given 
precision is more valuable in bad times because of higher uncertainty. Analyst revisions are signals about firm 
prospects that investors incorporate into stock prices based on their existing priors. In bad times, uncertainty 
about investors’ priors goes up. If the noise in analyst signals does not go up as much as the noise in the priors, 
analyst signals become more valuable, everything else equal. This assumes that analysts have expertise in 
incorporating into their forecasts the impact of bad macro conditions (Hutton, Lee, and Shu (2012) provide some 
evidence that analysts can better incorporate the implications of bad macroeconomic news into their forecasts 
than firm managers). The noise in analyst signals relative to prior uncertainty can decrease because 1) analysts 
take steps to ensure that the noise in their signals increases less than the uncertainty in investors’ priors, or 2) the 
uncertainty in investors’ priors increases more than the noise in analyst signals as investors’ alternative sources 
of information, such as private information, dry up in bad times. The latter situation forms the basis of our first 
hypothesis below. The former situation then forms the basis for our next two hypotheses. 
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B.1. Analyst Reliance Hypothesis  
Investors have multiple sources of information. For opaque firms, the availability of public information may 
be limited, but for other firms, investors have access to many public information signals that compete with the 
information provided by analysts. It follows that when uncertainty increases due to macro shocks, investor 
demand for analyst output increases more for more opaque firms. However, for analysts to be more valuable to 
investors in bad times, investors’ other sources of information cannot become more precise in bad times 
compared to analyst information. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) show that if investors’ private information 
becomes noisier, or if their ability to process public information accurately becomes noisier, investors will rely 
more on public information such as analyst signals. Bad times can be a regime change, where the advantage of 
some investors at processing data is impaired because they have to adapt to the new regime, or a situation where 
changes are more extreme so that processing public information is harder because there is little experience with 
similar situations. 
In our context, the Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) model suggests that the impact of analyst signals on 
investors’ priors is greater in bad times, when investors’ private information or information processing ability 
becomes noisier, which makes it harder for investors to assess the consequences of macro shocks. In good times, 
uncertainty about macro shocks is limited, so that realizations of macro shocks have relatively less impact on 
firms and hence are not as important in assessing the prospects of firms. In bad times, macro shock realizations 
are more extreme and have more of an impact on firms. Analyst output thus becomes more valuable because 
competing sources of information become less valuable to investors precisely when macro shocks can have 
more of an impact on firm prospects. The cross-sectional prediction is that the increase in uncertainty about the 
effect of macro shocks for firm prospects is most pronounced for more opaque firms.  
B.2. Analyst Effort Hypothesis  
Our next hypothesis predicts that analysts work harder in bad times to produce signals that are of better 
quality and hence have a greater impact. Glode (2011) finds that fund managers perform better in bad times to 
satisfy investors’ higher marginal utility in those times. While it is easier for investors to reward fund managers 
 10 
(directly through flows) than to reward analysts (indirectly through reputation), this incentive might also work 
for analysts through attrition risk. This hypothesis also predicts a higher frequency of reports and more accurate 
earnings forecasts after accounting for the increase in uncertainty in bad times. Further, this hypothesis predicts 
analyst effort to increase more in industries with more analyst competition, as more analyst competition in an 
industry leads to better analyst output (Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli (2017)). 
B.3. Analyst Expertise Hypothesis  
A related hypothesis predicts that if analysts have expertise in helping investors understand the implications 
of bad times, they can employ this expertise only during bad times. For example, Kacperczyk, Van 
Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) show that fund managers have market-timing skills during bad times but 
stock-picking skills in good times. If analysts also have such market-timing skills in bad times, their revisions 
might contain information for peer firms. This means that analysts revisions might have more of an impact in 
bad times as they contain more industry information during these times, consistent with the finding that analysts 
have expertise to predict industry returns (e.g., Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009), Kadan et al. (2012)).  
B.4. Conflicts of Interest Hypothesis  
In bad times, analysts in brokerages with investment banking divisions are likely to face less deal-related 
pressure to bias their research. To the extent that investment banking conflicts lead analysts to display an 
optimistic bias in their research (see, for example, Michaely and Womack (1999)), this bias might be lower in 
bad times when investment banking revenue drops. As a result, research might be of higher quality and hence 
have more of an impact in bad times due to reduced conflicts of interest.  
B.5. Overreaction Hypothesis  
Prior studies show evidence that in bad times, investors might react more strongly to news, such as earnings 
announcements (see, for example, Schmalz and Zhuk (2017)). Motivated by this result, our last hypothesis 
predicts that analyst revisions have more of an impact in bad times due to investor overreaction, which we 
capture by looking at the future drift of stock prices. Overreaction may be more likely to occur in bad times 
 11 
because, during those times, arbitrageurs are more constrained and cannot counteract inefficient reactions to 
revisions.  
 II. Main Analysis 
A. Bad Times Measures 
We employ four proxies for bad times. The first two focus on prominent financial crises: Crisis equals one 
for the periods September to November 1987 (1987 crisis), August to December 1998 (LTCM crisis), and July 
2007 to March 2009 (credit crisis), and Credit Crisis equals one for the credit crisis period, since this especially 
sharp and prolonged crisis warrants separate investigation. Our third proxy for bad times, Recession, equals one 
for NBER-defined recessions, specifically July 1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 
2007 to June 2009. Our fourth proxy for bad times is the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) policy uncertainty 
index. High Uncertainty equals one when the U.S. historical index is in the top tercile of available values 
(August 1983 to February 2014). This measure classifies more months as bad times compared to the three prior 
measures—7.7%, 5.6%, 9.8%, and 33.4% of the sample months are classified as bad times using Crisis, Credit 
Crisis, Recession, and High Uncertainty, respectively. 
B. Earnings Forecast and Recommendation Data 
We obtain data from Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail 
file.3 Specifically, one quarter-ahead earnings forecasts issued from August 1983 to December 2014 and actual 
earnings (announced from September 1983 to April 2015) are taken from I/B/E/S. We use the unadjusted file to 
mitigate the rounding problem in I/B/E/S (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)). Using the I/B/E/S split-
adjustment factors, we adjust the unadjusted forecast to be on the same per-share basis as the unadjusted actual 
                                                            
3 Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) report that matched records in the I/B/E/S recommendations data were altered 
between downloads from 2000 to 2007. In response to their paper, Thomson fixed the alterations in the recommendation 
history file as of February 12, 2007. The data set we use is dated December 17, 2015 and hence reflects these corrections. 
However, some large brokers are still missing from the current I/B/E/S files. To reinstate the missing years for these 
brokers, we use Capital IQ estimates to extract recommendations and earnings forecasts issued by the missing brokers and 
splice the collected data into our I/B/E/S sample. Spliced observations make up about 1.05% of the observations in the 
forecasts sample and 0.45% of the observations in the recommendations sample. 
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earnings. Financial firms (group 29 of the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classifications) are excluded 
from our main analysis (but included in robustness tests) because many crises began in the financial sector, 
making it hard to separate macro from industry bad times. 
We obtain individual analyst stock recommendations from the I/B/E/S Detail file for the period 1993 to 
2014. We define upgrades and downgrades using an analyst’s current rating minus the prior rating by the same 
analyst. A prior rating is assumed to be outstanding if it has not been stopped according to the I/B/E/S Stopped 
file and is less than one year old based on the I/B/E/S review date (following Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston 
(2009)). We exclude anonymous analysts, observations with no outstanding prior rating from the same analyst 
(i.e., analyst initiations and re-initiations are excluded), and recommendation changes for which the lagged stock 
price is less than one dollar. We also remove revisions that occur on firm-news days (following Loh and Stulz 
(2011)) because we do not want to consider ratings that merely repeat the information contained in firm-news 
releases. Firm-news days are defined as the three trading days centered around a Compustat earnings 
announcement date or a company earnings guidance date (guidance dates are from First Call Guidelines until it 
was discontinued on September 29, 2011, and from the I/B/E/S Guidance file thereafter), as well as days with 
multiple analysts issuing a recommendation for the firm.4 We employ similar filters when we examine the stock-
price impact of earnings forecast revisions. Stock returns come from CRSP. 
Table I here 
C. Evidence of Large Increases in Uncertainty During Bad Times 
In this section, we examine the variance of investors’ priors in bad times using an ex ante proxy. We show 
that there is indeed more uncertainty about the market and about individual stocks in bad times. In Panel A of 
                                                            
4 One concern with these filters is that if analysts piggyback on firm news more in bad times, a larger fraction of poor-
quality recommendations might be removed in bad times, making the remaining sample of recommendations appear 
“better” in bad times than in good times. We find, however, that analysts piggyback more in good times. For example in 
non-Crisis periods, 37.7% (30.3%) of downgrades (upgrades) are removed by the filters compared to 33.8% (27.0%) in 
Crisis periods. We also examine whether recommendation changes that occur on firm-news days are more impactful in bad 
times. We find strong evidence for downgrades (all four measures of bad times) but mixed evidence for upgrades (only two 
of four measures). Because it is hard to determine whether these effects can be attributed to analysts or to the firm news 
events themselves, we focus our analysis on the sample that is not contaminated by firm news.  
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Table I, we report daily estimates of the VIX from CBOE as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty. These data start in 
1990 and overlap most of our 1983 to 2014 sample period. The typical daily VIX (quoted as an annualized 
standard deviation) in Crisis periods is 31.339, while in good times it is 18.865. Therefore, the VIX in Crisis 
periods is more than 60% greater than in non-Crisis periods, with this difference being statistically significant. 
The increase in the VIX is similar for Credit Crisis and Recession periods. The increase in the VIX is smaller 
for the High Uncertainty periods although it is still sizable. Hence, using all of our measures of bad times, ex 
ante market volatility increases sharply in bad times, showing that investors’ priors become less precise in bad 
times. 
In Panel B of Table I, we report the annualized implied volatilities of stocks five trading days before they 
are subject to a recommendation change. The implied volatility data come from Option Metrics’ Volatility 
Surface file, using the average of the interpolated implied volatility from puts and calls with 30 days to 
expiration and a delta of 50. We are able to match 76% of the recommendation changes in our sample with an 
implied volatility. Starting with the Crisis measure of bad times, we see that for downgrades the option-implied 
volatility is 61.820% in bad times and 47.319% in good times, with the difference of 13.501% being statistically 
significant. For upgrades, the difference in implied volatilities is very similar. We find similar results using other 
measures of bad times. Hence, using all of our measures of bad times, we find that ex ante volatility at the firm 
level is higher just before recommendation changes in bad times compared to good times. 
D. Stock-Price Impact of Recommendation Changes 
We now address the question of whether the stock-price impact of analyst output is greater in bad times. We 
take the view that if analyst output moves stock prices, it changes investors’ priors and hence is valuable to 
investors. We first examine the stock-price impact of recommendation changes. 
Because recommendation levels can be biased, recommendation changes are more reliable than levels as a 
setting to evaluate analyst impact (e.g., Boni and Womack (2006) show that rating changes contain more 
information for returns than rating levels). To estimate the stock-price impact of a recommendation change, we 
use the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from the recommendation date to the following trading day, that is, 
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over the [0,1] event window. If the recommendation is issued on a nontrading day or after trading hours, day 0 is 
defined as the next trading day. We compute the CAR as the cumulative return on the common stock less the 
cumulative return on an equally weighted characteristics-matched size, book-to-market (B/M), and momentum 
portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997, DGTW)). Panel A of Table II, which summarizes our main results, 
reports the average CAR of recommendation changes, separated into upgrades and downgrades, issued in bad 
times and in good times with statistical significance based on standard errors clustered by calendar day.  
We see that downgrades and upgrades have a larger impact during bad times. The differences are stark—for 
example, the average two-day CAR for a recommendation downgrade is -2.678% in Crisis periods and -1.687% 
in non-Crisis periods. Both CARs are significant at the 1% level, indicating that analysts have an impact in both 
good and bad times. However, the significant difference of -0.991% shows that downgrades have a larger 
impact in bad times. The same is true for upgrades: the CAR for upgrades is 2.658% in Crisis periodsand 
2.044% in non-Crisis periods, with the difference in CARs of 0.614% again significant at the 1% level. We 
continue to find evidence of a larger impact of recommendations in bad times using our other measures of bad 
times.5  
Table II here 
We next examine whether analysts are more influential in bad times using the definition of influential 
recommendations in Loh and Stulz (2011). Loh and Stulz (2011) show that it is important to account for 
whether a recommendation change results in a stock-price reaction that is noticed by investors, that is, whether 
the rating change results in a reaction that is significant at the firm level based on the firm’s prior stock-price 
                                                            
5 Using a bad times dummy means that the baseline group is non-bad times, which we refer to as good times. This 
approach is consistent with, say, how the NBER defines recessions and labels other periods as expansions. In tests reported 
in the Internet Appendix (available in the online version of the article on the Journal of Finance website), we use monthly 
market returns to sort non-bad times into two groups, normal times and good times. Using normal times as the baseline 
group, we continue to find a stronger CAR impact of recommendation changes in bad times. We find little change in the 
CAR in good times compared to normal times, except for upgrades, which have a slightly larger impact in good times 
compared to normal times.  
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volatility. 6  Table II reports the fraction of recommendation changes that are influential during bad times 
compared to good times.   
The results are striking. Using all of our measures of bad times, we find that a recommendation downgrade 
is significantly more likely to be influential during bad times than during good times. The difference is 
especially large when we use the Crisis or Credit Crisis measures of bad times. Using these measures, a 
recommendation downgrade’s probability of being influential is one-third higher during bad times (e.g., 
15.278% versus 11.681% using Crisis). The differences are smaller using the Recession and High Uncertainty 
measures of bad times. Turning to recommendation upgrades, we find that they are also significantly more likely 
to be influential using all of our measures of bad times. The results for the fraction of influential 
recommendations are therefore similar to the CAR results.  
 In Figure 1, we plot the summary of our results in Table II. As can be seen, both upgrades and downgrades 
are associated with stronger stock-price reactions and are more likely to be influential in bad times. 
Fig. 1 here 
Thus far, we have only presented univariate results. Because analysts’ recommendation impact can also be 
affected by characteristics other than bad times, it is important to examine whether our results are robust to 
controlling for such characteristics. In Table III, we report estimates of OLS panel regressions in which we 
control for firm, analyst, and recommendation characteristics. 
We use the following control variables that are known to be related to the impact of recommendations. First, 
we control for LFR, the analyst’s leader-follower ratio in the previous year, constructed following Cooper, Day, 
and Lewis (2001), who show that reports from leader analysts have greater stock-price impact.7 Second, we 
                                                            
6 Specifically, we check whether the CAR is in the same direction as the recommendation change and the absolute value 
of the CAR exceeds 1.96 × √2 × 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀. We multiply by √2 since the CAR is a two-day CAR. 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 is the standard deviation of 
residuals from a daily time-series regression of past three-month (days −69 to −6) firm returns against the Fama and French 
(1993) three factors. This measure roughly captures recommendation changes associated with noticeable abnormal returns 
that can be attributed to the recommendation changes. 
7 To compute LFR, the gaps between the current recommendation and the previous two recommendations from other 
brokers are computed and summed. We repeat this calculation for the next two recommendations. The leader-follower ratio 
is then defined as the gap sum of the prior two recommendations divided by the gap sum of the next two recommendations. 
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control for Star Analyst, an indicator variable for analysts elected to the All-American team (with first, second, 
third team status, or as runner-up) in the most recent Institutional Investor annual (in October) poll, as Fang and 
Yasuda (2014) show that star analysts have better performance. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) further 
show that analyst experience impacts performance, and thus we control for Relative Experience, the difference 
between analyst experience (number of quarters since appearance on I/B/E/S) and the average experience of all 
analysts covering the firm. Next, because forecast accuracy can proxy for skill in picking stocks (Loh and Mian 
(2006)), we control for Accuracy Quintile, the average forecast accuracy quintile (relative to other analysts 
covering the firm) of the analyst based on the firms covered in the past year, where the quintile rank is 
increasing in forecast accuracy. We also control for Broker Size, the number of analysts employed by the broker 
as a proxy for the resources available to analysts. Turning to firm characteristics, we include the following 
controls: # Analysts, which is the number of analysts covering the firm; Size, last June’s market cap; BM, the 
book-to-market equity ratio (computed and aligned following Fama and French (2006)); Momentum, the buy-
and-hold return from month t–12 to t–2; and Stock Volatility, the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the 
prior month. Adding these controls allows us to determine whether our univariate results are robust to 
controlling for changing firm and analyst characteristics from good to bad times. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Panel C of Table I for the full sample, as well as 
separately for good and bad times based on one of our measures of bad times, namely Crisis. These statistics 
represent averages of the characteristics across all of the recommendation change observations within the 
downgrade or upgrade sample. As can be seen, most analyst characteristics look similar between good and bad 
times, with the exception that there appears to be a smaller fraction of star analysts in bad times. With respect to 
the firm characteristics, we find that the average Size, Momentum, BM, and # Analysts per firm decrease in bad 
times, while Stock Volatility is markedly higher in bad times. 
Table III here 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
A ratio larger than one indicates a leader analyst, since other brokers issue new ratings quickly in response to the analyst’s 
current recommendation.  
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Table III reports results of the regressions that include these controls. For each measure of bad times, we 
first estimate the CAR regression using a constant and a bad times indicator. The coefficient on the intercept is 
the CAR impact of good times and that on the bad times indicator is the additional impact of downgrades in bad 
times (equivalent to the univariate CAR difference in Table II). . We then add the controls for firm, analyst, and 
forecast characteristics, as well as industry fixed effects (Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification). 
For the count variables Broker Size and # Analysts, we add one before taking logs. Standard errors are clustered 
by calendar day to account for cross-sectional correlation of returns on the same day (clustering by firm or by 
analyst typically leads to similar or statistically stronger results). When we focus on downgrades in models (1) 
to (8), we see that, regardless of whether we include the control variables, the coefficients on all of the measures 
for bad times are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This shows that the stock-price impact of 
analyst downgrades is greater in bad times compared to good times. To gauge the economic significance of the 
effect of bad times after the controls are added, we compare the bad times coefficient to the “Good times 𝑌𝑌� ,” 
which is the predicted CAR when the control variables are at their means and the bad times indicator is zero. In 
model (2), the bad times coefficient is -0.998% and the good times predicted CAR is -1.761%, which means that 
the CAR impact is about 1.57 times (
−0.998+(−1.761)
−1.761 ) higher in bad times, an effect that is similar to the case 
without the controls.  
Looking at the coefficients on the controls, we see that recommendations by analysts with a greater leader-
follower ratio have a larger impact. Not surprisingly in light of earlier literature, we also see that 
recommendation changes by larger brokers have more of an impact, as do the downgrades of star analysts. Also 
in line with the literature, recommendation changes have less of an impact when a firm is followed by more 
analysts or when the firm is larger. Lastly, the impact of analyst downgrades is greater when the firm’s prior 
stock volatility is higher. Turning to recommendation upgrades, we find that with or without the controls, 
upgrades also have a significantly larger stock-price reaction regardless of the measure of bad times that we 
employ.  
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Table IV repeats the analysis in Table III by estimating probit models for whether a recommendation change 
is influential. The table reports the marginal effects, which measure the change in probability when changing the 
variable by one standard deviation centered around its mean (or a zero to one change for a dummy variable), 
with z-statistics in parentheses (based on standard errors clustered by calendar day). We see that downgrades are 
more likely to be influential using all of our measures of bad times. Interestingly, the marginal effects of the bad 
times indicator variables are more pronounced when we control for analyst, firm, and recommendation 
characteristics as well as industry fixed effects. For example, in regression (1) of Table IV, the marginal effect 
on Crisis indicates that the univariate increase in the probability of a downgrade being influential in Crisis 
periods is 3.6% (compared to the predicted probability of a downgrade being influential, labeled “Predicted 
Prob.,” of 12.1%). When we add the control variables, the coefficient on Crisis increases to 6.5% (compared to 
the predicted probability of 11.7%). Turning to recommendation upgrades, we find that upgrades are also more 
likely to be influential during bad times using all of our bad times measures, with the effect also stronger when 
we add the control variables.  
Table IV here 
Overall, we find strong evidence that the impact of recommendation changes is greater in bad times. Some 
researchers suggest that the reaction of the market to good and bad news might be asymmetric depending on 
whether times are good or bad (e.g., Beber and Brandt (2010) and Veronesi (1999)). We find that the increased 
impact of recommendation changes in bad times applies to both upgrades and downgrades, although the 
magnitudes are larger for downgrades. Importantly, the result that analysts have more of an impact in bad times 
is inconsistent with the difficult environment hypothesis, the shirking hypothesis, and the inattention hypothesis, 
all of which predict that analyst research quality should be lower in bad times. Instead, our result supports the 
hypotheses that predict better-quality analyst output in bad times.8 
                                                            
8  A caveat with our results is that the credit crisis overlaps with a sizable fraction of our bad times measures. 
Specifically, 72% and 43% of the Crisis and Recession months respectively occur during the credit crisis. As a result, when 
we exclude the credit crisis observations, we find weak and at most mixed evidence that analysts have more of an impact in 
Crisis or Recession periods. However, this issue is mitigated for the High Uncertainty measure of bad times as only 12% of 
High Uncertainty months occur during the credit crisis. Using the High Uncertainty measure of bad times, excluding credit 
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E. Stock-Price Impact of Earnings Forecast Revisions  
Our analysis thus far looks at stock recommendations, which are essentially the analyst’s summary measure 
of the future prospects of a firm’s stock. We now focus on analyst forecasts of a specific measure of 
fundamentals—earnings. The use of earnings forecast revisions also allows us to control for the amount of 
information in the revision by using the forecast revision magnitude as larger-magnitude revisions are likely to 
be associated with larger stock-price reactions. A revision is defined using the analyst’s own prior forecast of 
quarterly earnings, provided that the prior forecast has not been stopped and is still active (less than one year 
old) using its I/B/E/S review date. We then scale by the lagged stock price and call this variable Forecast 
Revision. We remove revisions on dates that coincide with corporate events (in particular, the three trading days 
around earnings announcements and guidance dates, as well as multiple-forecast dates) so that we do not 
incorrectly give credit to the analyst for stock-price changes driven by company announcements. 
We examine multivariate regressions of forecast revision CARs and probits of forecast revision influential 
probability. Both sets of tests show that the impact of earnings forecast revisions is higher in bad times. For 
brevity, we report only the probit results here; the CAR results are reported in the Internet Appendix. In Table 
V, we estimate probits where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one when the forecast is 
classified as influential. All the marginal effects are statistically significant, indicating that analysts make more 
influential earnings forecast revisions in bad times compared to good times. The economic effect is also large. 
For example, the marginal effect for Crisis in model (2) is 0.036, which means that in Crisis times the influential 
probability of a downward revision rises by 3.6%, which is a large increase from the 4.5% predicted influential 
probability in the probit model. The coefficient on Forecast Revision itself is statistically significant but does 
not remove the statistical significance of bad times, meaning that it is not the case that larger-magnitude 
revisions in bad times explain their greater influential probability. 
Table V here 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
crisis observations does not affect the finding of increased analyst impact in bad times. These results are reported in the 
Internet Appendix.  
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Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that analyst output is indeed more valuable in bad times. 
Whether we consider their recommendation changes, which represent their overall assessment of a firm’s 
prospects, or a specific change in their forecasts of a firm’s short-term fundamentals (quarterly earnings), we 
find that analysts’ impact on stock prices is more influential in bad times.  
 III. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we conduct several robustness tests to examine whether our finding of greater analyst impact 
in bad times is new to the literature and whether it is robust.  
 A. Does Market-Wide or Firm-Specific Uncertainty Drive Our Results? 
Our measures of bad times are based on changes in aggregate economic activity. We use a market-wide 
definition instead of a firm-specific definition because market-wide bad times are more likely to be exogenous 
to the analyst and the industry. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016), for example, show that 
in recessions, an average stock’s aggregate risk increases substantially but the change in idiosyncratic risk is not 
statistically different from zero. This means that bad times likely introduce an exogenous change in uncertainty 
in the average firm. Several previous studies examine how firm-level uncertainty affects analysts’ output. 
Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) find that analyst reports are more informative when trading volume and 
stock return volatility are higher, and Loh and Stulz (2011) find that analyst recommendations are more 
influential when firms have higher earnings forecast dispersion. Although our analyses already control for firm-
specific uncertainty, to further mitigate concerns, we employ a different approach here.  
We first decompose the variance of a firm’s stock returns over the prior month into macro, industry (Fama 
and French (1997) 30-industry classification), and residual (firm-specific) components by regressing daily 
returns on market (CRSP value-weighted) returns and market-purged industry returns. Defining high uncertainty 
as the highest tercile of the relevant variance component over the firm’s history, in Panel A of Table VI we 
regress recommendation change CAR on these three high uncertainty dummies. Using the highest quintile 
instead of tercile or cross-sectional sorts instead of time-series sorts does not affect our results (see the Internet 
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Appendix). We find that all three high uncertainty dummies are related to significantly larger CAR impact in a 
univariate setting. When we consider all three uncertainty dummies together and add analyst control variables 
(we do not include firm controls since they may be highly correlated with firm-level uncertainty), we find that 
only the coefficient on the market-wide uncertainty dummy remains statistically significant across all 
specifications, particularly for downgrades. Hence, we believe that our results are new in that we show it is 
market-wide uncertainty rather than firm-specific uncertainty that drives analysts’ greater impact during periods 
of high uncertainty.  
Table VI here 
 B. Do Reports That Reiterate Recommendations Have More of an Impact? 
Although we find that the impact of analyst reports containing revisions is greater in bad times, it could be 
the case that analysts have fewer recommendation changes and more reiterations, in which case analysts might 
actually be less useful in bad times. We therefore examine the frequency of recommendation changes and 
reiterations in bad times. It is well known that I/B/E/S does not record all reiterations (see for example, Brav and 
Lehavy (2003)). We infer reiterations outside of those recorded on I/B/E/S by assuming that the most recent 
outstanding I/B/E/S rating is reiterated whenever there is a quarterly forecast in the I/B/E/S Detail file or a price 
target forecast in the I/B/E/S Price Target file but no corresponding new rating in the recommendation file. As 
before, we remove observations that occur together with firm news. In the Internet Appendix, we find that in 
non-Crisis periods, the average number of recommendation changes per month for a firm (across all analysts 
covering it) is 0.183, whereas in Crisis times, this figure rise to 0.238 (a 30% increase). We similarly find across 
our other measures of bad times that the number of recommendation changes goes up in bad times. Hence, we 
find no evidence that analysts are more reluctant to revise recommendations in bad times. For reiterations, we 
find 0.771 reiterations per month in non-Crisis periods and 0.903 in Crisis periods (a 17% increase). The finding 
that the number of reiterations goes up holds using our other measures of bad times (see Internet Appendix). 
There is no evidence that the number of reiterations goes up at the expense of the number of revisions as the 
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number of recommendations increases just like the number of reiterations does. Rather, the evidence simply 
shows that analysts act more often.  
In Panel B of Table VI, we investigate whether these more numerous reiterations in bad times have 
differential impact. We find that the impact of unfavorable reiterations (reiterated sell or reiterated hold since 
most of the literature considers holds unfavorable) is higher in bad times across all specifications, similar to our 
findings on revisions. Hence, analysts have more of an impact when issuing reiterations in bad times. We find 
less evidence of this for favorable reiterations (reiterated buy), with mostly lower impact in bad times. Overall, 
there is no evidence that analysts reiterate more in bad times at the expense of revising less. Moreover, analysts’ 
reiterations, especially of unfavorable ratings, are more informative in bad times compared to those in good 
times.  
 C. Does the Market React More to All Types of Firm News in Bad Times? 
We now examine whether the impact of all firm news is greater in bad times. If there is something 
systematic about how the market reacts to news in bad times, the heightened reaction to analyst output in bad 
times may be explained by the fact that the market reacts more to all news. Schmalz and Zhuk (2017), for 
instance, find that the market also reacts more to earnings announcements in bad times. To examine this 
possibility, we adapt the methodology in Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006) and estimate a panel regression of 
individual daily absolute stock returns on dummy variables for important firm news events, namely, 
recommendation changes, reiterations, earnings announcements, earnings guidance, dividend announcements, 
and insider trades. Following Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006), these dummies are set to one in day 0 of the 
event, or day 1 of the event if the announcement occurs after trading hours (when the event time is available for 
us to check this). Dividend announcements are taken from the CRSP event file and insider trades come from the 
Thomson Insider Form 4 files. The insider trade date is the date when the insider trade occurs and the filing date 
is the date when it is reported to the SEC and hence becomes publicly known.  
We expect the coefficients on the firm news dummies to be positive and the coefficients on 
recommendation-related dummies to remain positive in the presence of the other firm news dummies. As 
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controls, we include our firm characteristics variables (size, B/M, momentum, idiosyncratic volatility, etc.) as 
well as industry fixed effects. We also add bad times indicators, whose coefficients are expected to be positive if 
the market in general is more volatile in bad times, and interactions between the firm news dummies and the bad 
times indicators, whose coefficients are expected to be positive if the market reacts more to any news in bad 
times. Of particular interest is whether the recommendation-related interactions with the bad times indicator 
variables remain significantly positive in the presence of the other firm news dummies and their interactions. If 
so, then this would mean that the market’s heightened reaction to recommendations in bad times is robust to 
controlling for the market’s differential reaction to news in general in bad times.  
In Panel C of Table VI, we find that the recommendation change and reiteration dummies are always 
statistically significant both alone and in the presence of the other firm news dummies (based on standard errors 
clustered by calendar day). These results indicate that both recommendation changes and reiterations are more 
informative in bad times, in line with our earlier results. When we include all of the interactions with bad times, 
the coefficient on the recommendation change dummy interacted with bad times remains positive and 
significant, and often has the largest magnitude (that recommendations elicit the largest reaction when compared 
to other firm events is consistent with Bradley et al. (2014)). Thus, our main findings are robust to controlling 
for the differential impact of firm news in bad times. We also find that the market does not react more to all 
types of firm news in bad times: Earnings announcements do elicit greater reactions in bad times, but guidance 
announcements elicit lower reactions, and evidence on reactions to dividend announcements and insider trades 
is mixed. 
 D. Alternative Specifications and Samples 
Differences in analyst characteristics could spuriously explain our results if analyst performance is better on 
average in bad times than in good times. Controlling for analyst characteristics addresses the concern that the 
overall quality of the pool of analysts is different in bad times. While it seems unlikely that the change in the 
analyst pool would be large enough to explain our findings, which already control for analyst characteristics, we 
nonetheless conduct two further sets of tests. First, we repeat our tests above on the subsample of analysts who 
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are present before and after the longest bad times period we consider, namely, the credit crisis. These analysts, 
who appear in I/B/E/S before 2007 and continue to issue reports after March 2009, are responsible for almost 
half of the recommendations in our sample. These tests allow us to ascertain the performance differential 
between good and bad times for an identifiable set of seasoned analysts. Second, we augment the tests on this 
subsample with analyst fixed effects. Under this approach, the increased impact of analyst recommendations and 
forecasts during the credit crisis cannot be explained by a selection effect or unobserved analyst characteristics. 
Results reported in the Internet Appendix show that the impact of recommendation changes continues to be 
higher in bad times compared to good times when analyst fixed effects are added, and in many cases the results 
are stronger. For example, in the model with the control variables, the marginal effect of a Crisis period on the 
probability of a downgrade being influential is 0.059 without analyst fixed effects. After adding analyst fixed 
effects, the marginal effect becomes 0.067. For upgrades, the increased probability of the recommendation 
change being influential in a Crisis period is 0.043, and this is unchanged with analyst fixed effects added. We 
also tried broker fixed effects instead of analyst fixed effects with this subsample and find similar results (see 
the Internet Appendix).  
In another set of tests reported in the Internet Appendix, we control for whether an analyst’s career starts 
during bad times. Analysts who begin their careers during bad times may have more experience with such times 
and hence might do better in such periods. Alternatively, brokers may hire analysts with special expertise when 
bad times strike. To account for such possibilities, we construct a dummy variable that is equal to one for 
analysts who began their careers in any of the bad times periods. We also consider another dummy variable that 
is equal to one for analysts who began their careers during the credit crisis. When we add these dummy variables 
to our main regressions, we find that these coefficients are mostly statistically insignificant and all of our main 
findings are unaffected. We conclude that analysts who join brokerages during bad times are unlikely to be 
driving our finding that analysts produce better research in bad times.  
Finally, recall that we exclude financial firms from our baseline analysis because many of the macro bad 
times periods that we consider started in the financial sector, e.g., the credit crisis and most of the recessions. 
Thus, for the financial sector, the periods that we define as macro bad times are often also industry bad times. 
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Industry bad times might also not be as exogenous to analysts as macro bad times are. For robustness, however, 
we repeat our analysis on financial firms (group 29 of the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification). 
We find that recommendation changes made on financial firms also have significantly greater CAR impact in 
bad times. For example, as reported in the Internet Appendix, the mean recommendation downgrade CAR for 
financial firms in non-Crisis periods is -1.087% while in bad times it elicits an additional -2.118% abnormal 
return. For upgrades, the non-Crisis CAR is 1.315% but the Crisis CAR is 1.473% larger. The results are 
similarly strong using our other measures of bad times and after adding the controls. For the CAR impact of 
earnings forecast revisions, the coefficients on the bad times dummies are mostly insignificant. Hence, while our 
recommendation change results are robust to firms in the financial industry, the results for forecast revisions are 
weaker. Importantly, for this set of firms it is hard to distinguish whether the results are triggered by industry or 
macro bad times. 
 IV. Are Analyst Signals More Precise in Bad Times? 
Having established that analyst output is more influential in bad times, we now investigate why this is so. 
Analysts may be more influential because their signals are more precise in bad times. If so, their forecast errors 
should be lower. The literature typically measures forecast errors using the absolute difference between actual 
and forecasted earnings per share, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings or price. It would be surprising 
if such a measure of forecast errors were lower in bad times because earnings become harder to forecast in bad 
times. Indeed, we find that, according to this traditional measure of absolute forecast errors, analysts are less 
precise in bad times, consistent with Jacob (1997), Chopra (1998), and Hope and Kang (2005). We argue that 
this traditional measure is not appropriate for investigating why analysts are more influential in bad times as the 
usefulness of analyst signals of a given precision depends on the uncertainty that investors face—to wit, if 
investors face no underlying uncertainty about firm prospects, analyst signals that have a small amount of noise 
are useless. Hence, to compare the usefulness of analyst forecasts over time, the precision of analyst signals has 
to be evaluated relative to firm uncertainty. This is similar in spirit to the way we define influential 
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recommendations by scaling recommendation CARs by prior stock return volatility. Under this new approach, 
we find that analysts are actually more precise in bad times.  
 A. Using a Traditional Measure of Forecast Errors 
We first report results using a traditional measure of forecast error. For each analyst, the forecast error is 
actual earnings minus the final unrevised one-quarter-ahead forecast. We focus on forecasts that are revisions of 
prior forecasts since those are the ones that we found earlier to be associated with higher stock-price reactions. 
We scale forecast errors by the absolute value of actual earnings instead of stock prices because bad times are by 
definition associated with lower stock prices, so forecast errors would be magnified when scaled by stock prices. 
When scaling forecast errors by the absolute value of actual earnings, denominator values smaller than $0.25 are 
set to $0.25 to limit the impact of small denominators. We then winsorize scaled forecast errors at the extreme 
1% before we take absolute values.9  
Table VII here 
Models (1) to (8) in Table VII formally test whether the traditional measure of analysts’ absolute forecast 
error is larger in bad times. Standard errors are clustered by industry-quarter. We also tried clustering by 
analyst-quarter or firm-quarter, and the results are usually similar or stronger. We use similar control variables 
as in the earlier tables but also add controls that are shown to be relevant for predicting the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts. First, we include Optimistic, a dummy variable that equals one when the forecast is in the top half of 
all final unrevised forecasts in that quarter, as Lim (2001) shows that analysts trade off optimism and accuracy 
because optimism facilitates access to private information from the covered firm’s management. Next, we 
include Log Days to Annc, the log of one plus the number of days between the forecast date and the next 
announcement of actual earnings, which serves as a control for forecast recency because forecasts closer to the 
actual earnings announcement will obviously be more accurate (Clement (1999)). Next, because days with 
                                                            
9 One concern related to using the absolute value of actual earnings as the deflator is that lower earnings in bad times 
could artificially inflate forecast errors (although negative earnings might mitigate this concern). In robustness tests 
reported in the Internet Appendix, when estimating the multivariate regressions for the traditional measure of forecast 
errors, we use unscaled forecast errors while controlling for the stock price of the firm in addition to other control variables. 
We find that our results are similar.   
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activity from multiple analysts are most likely caused by a corporate news release (Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 
(2008)), we include Multiple Forecast Day, an indicator variable that captures days when more than one analyst 
issues a forecast on the firm. Finally, to control for differences of opinion, we include the forecast Dispersion, 
the standard deviation of quarterly forecasts making up the final consensus scaled by the absolute value of the 
mean estimate. 
We see in Table VII that traditional absolute forecast errors are significantly larger in bad times. Model (1) 
shows that in non-Crisis periods the absolute forecast error is 14.835% of actual earnings, while in Crisis 
periods, the absolute forecast error is 2.775% higher. This increase in absolute forecast error holds after taking 
into account analyst, firm, and forecast characteristics. The same results obtain using our other measures of bad 
times, which suggests that analysts are more imprecise during bad times.  
 B. Absolute Forecast Errors Scaled by Stock Volatility 
We now examine whether analyst forecast errors are larger in bad times after accounting for the increased 
uncertainty that investors face in bad times. To do so, we normalize absolute forecast errors by the stock’s daily 
return volatility (annualized) in the prior month. This allows us to examine whether the increase in absolute 
forecast error can be explained by the increase in the underlying uncertainty surrounding the firm in bad times. 
To our knowledge, the literature has not considered such a measure of forecast precision, which is akin to 
measuring the forecast error per unit of uncertainty. Models (9) to (16) in Table VII report results using this new 
measure of adjusted forecast precision. We see that the intercept in model (9) is 26.852, which can be 
interpreted as the percentage absolute forecast error per unit (100%) of stock volatility. Hence, the coefficient of 
-6.667 on Crisis, which describes the difference in the uncertainty-adjusted absolute forecast error during bad 
times compared to good times, tells us that precision improves by 25% (from 
−6.667
26.852) in bad times. We see that 
this percentage improvement is similar after including the controls and using our other measures of bad times. 
We also tried using the implied volatility (when available) five trading days before the forecast as a proxy for 
the uncertainty facing the firm and find similar results (see the Internet Appendix).  
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The finding of improved analyst forecast precision during bad times supports our main result that the stock-
price impact of analyst revisions is greater in bad times. This larger impact is justified by the higher earnings 
forecast precision per unit of underlying uncertainty in bad times compared to good times.    
 V. Why is the Impact of Analyst Output Greater in Bad Times? 
So far we have shown that the impact of analyst output is greater in bad times and that analysts offer more 
precise signals during bad times after taking into account the uncertainty that investors face. In this section, we 
explore possible explanations for these results. We presented various potential explanations in Section I. 
Clearly, we find no support for the hypotheses in Section I that predict analysts will have less of an impact in 
bad times. We therefore investigate the hypotheses that predict analysts to have more of an impact in bad times, 
namely, the analyst reliance hypothesis, the hypothesis that analysts work harder in bad times, the hypothesis 
that analyst output reflects different skills in bad times, the hypothesis that conflicts of interest affect analyst 
output less in bad times, and the hypothesis that the market overreacts to analysts in bad times.   
 A. Analyst Reliance Hypothesis 
The analyst reliance hypothesis predicts that analyst output becomes more valuable in bad times, especially 
for more opaque stocks. To proxy for stocks that are more opaque and for which investors might rely more on 
analysts, we use stocks with no company guidance, low institutional ownership, high idiosyncratic volatility to 
total volatility, small size, no traded options (a proxy for less informed trading), and low analyst coverage.10 We 
then examine the impact of these characteristics on our main results in a cross-sectional analysis by interacting 
the bad times dummies with dummy variables representing these characteristics. Specifically, NoGuidance 
equals one when the firm has had no earnings guidance in the last month, LowIO equals one for the lowest 
                                                            
10 In the uncertainty literature, an increase in idiosyncratic volatility proxies for an increase in uncertainty (Bloom 
(2009)). Idiosyncratic volatility has also been viewed as evidence of informed trading (in Roll (1988)), as a proxy for 
skewness (Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011)), and as a proxy for illiquidity (Han and Lesmond (2011)). Ultimately, 
whether analysts have more or less impact on high idiosyncratic volatility stocks during bad times is an empirical question. 
Under the analyst reliance hypothesis, if idiosyncratic volatility is a proxy for uncertainty, everything else equal analyst 
output should be more valuable for stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility provided that the precision of analyst output 
decreases less than proportionately when uncertainty increases. Whether this is true is an empirical question. 
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quintile of firms sorted by the most recent Thomson 13F-reported fraction of shares owned by institutions, 
HighIVOLfrac equals one for the highest quintile of stocks sorted on the prior-quarter fraction of firm-specific 
daily return volatility over total volatility (total variance is decomposed into its market, industry, and residual 
components as described in the robustness tests earlier), SmallSize equals one for the lowest quintile rank 
(NYSE breakpoints) of the prior June market cap, NoOptions equals one when the firm has no traded options 
(checking for availability of data in Option Metrics), and LowCoverage equals one for the lowest analyst 
coverage quintile based on the number of analysts issuing recommendations in the prior quarter. We use dummy 
variables in these cross-sectional tests for ease of interpreting the coefficients.  
Table VIII here 
In Table VIII, we report the coefficients on the bad times dummies, the firm characteristics dummies, and 
their interactions with and without controls. We find that for most of the proxies for opacity, increased opacity is 
associated with a greater impact of recommendation changes in good times. When the opacity proxies are 
interacted with bad times, this relation become stronger, which shows that the increase in the impact of analysts 
in bad times is stronger for such firms. The strongest results are for the NoGuidance, SmallSize, and 
LowCoverage interactions. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that investors rely more on analysts 
in bad times for stocks that are more opaque.11  
 B. Analyst Effort Hypothesis 
We next examine the role of analyst incentives as an explanation for why analysts have more of an impact 
during bad times. Prior studies argue that the higher marginal utility of investors during bad times motivates 
fund managers to perform better (e.g., Glode (2011)). If analysts also face such incentives, they might exert 
more effort to produce better research in bad times. For fund managers, investors can reward the manager 
                                                            
11 In the Internet Appendix, we also examine whether some types of analysts are more likely to have a greater impact in 
bad times. To do so, we look at large brokers (top quintile based on analysts issuing ratings in the prior quarter), star 
analysts, experienced analysts (top quintile based on number of quarters in I/B/E/S as of the current quarter), and highly 
influential analysts (top quintile of fraction of influential recommendations in the previous year). While there is some 
evidence that the last characteristic is associated with a greater impact in bad times (highly influential analysts have more of 
an impact for downgrades in bad times using the credit crisis and recession measures of bad times), this is not the case for 
the other characteristics. 
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directly with fund flows. For analysts, investors can reward the analyst only indirectly though the analyst 
reputation channel. Further, during bad times, analysts might face career concerns due to increased attrition risk 
and lower compensation. The higher likelihood of job loss conditional on effort might therefore motivate 
analysts to work harder.  
In Table IX, we examine whether analysts are more likely to disappear from the profession during bad times 
using probit regressions of analyst attrition. For the recommendations sample, Disappear is a dummy variable 
that equals one for the analyst-year in which the analyst makes no recommendation in I/B/E/S across all firms in 
the following year. Looking over a period of one year minimizes the possibility that the analyst’s 
recommendation frequency was temporarily reduced. The bad times indicator equals one if the following year 
contains one of the bad times periods of interest. Control variables are averaged for each analyst-year and 
standard errors are clustered by analyst.   
Table IX here 
We see that across the different bad times periods, analysts are 1% to 4% more likely to disappear from 
I/B/E/S. This is a sizable change given that the predicted probability of attrition is about 11% to 13% in these 
models. An important independent variable in the regressions is the probability that an analyst is influential that 
year, which is computed as the fraction of the analyst’s recommendation changes that are influential. This 
influential probability is typically negatively related to analyst attrition—issuing high-impact recommendation 
changes reduces analyst attrition. When we interact this influential probability with bad times, we see that the 
likelihood of attrition is even lower. Taken together, these results suggest that analysts work harder to avoid 
attrition in bad times since attrition is more likely in bad times and research impact reduces the likelihood of 
attrition.12  
Having established that the likelihood of attrition is related to performance, we examine two additional 
measures of analyst output quantity to assess whether the increased analyst impact and precision are 
                                                            
12 In the Internet Appendix, we estimate the attrition probits on the quarterly earnings forecasts sample and find weaker 
results. Hence, career concerns are a plausible explanation for why analysts work harder in bad times, with influential 
recommendation changes being more important than accurate earnings forecasts in reducing attrition risk.  
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accompanied by more effort in bad times. Above, we see that the number of recommendation changes and 
reiterations increases. Here, we first look at analyst activity as proxied by the number of forecasts that the 
analyst makes for a firm-quarter. Assuming that a particular analyst’s coverage of a firm starts with the first 
quarter and stops with the last quarter that analyst is featured in I/B/E/S for that firm, we count for each firm the 
number of forecasts that the analyst makes in each of the coverage quarters. Quarters in the coverage period 
with no forecast from the analyst are assigned an analyst activity value of zero. 
In Table X, we estimate regressions explaining analyst activity where the dependent variable is the log of 
one plus the number of analyst forecasts, which are computed at the firm-quarter-analyst level. The control 
variables are now averages of the given characteristic within the analyst-firm-quarter. The relevant bad times 
indicator variables equal one when any part the given quarter is defined as bad times according to the bad times 
measure used. We see that there is indeed more analyst activity in bad times even after including all of the 
control variables. Given the dependent variable is the log of one plus the number of analyst forecasts, the Crisis 
coefficient of 0.063 and non-Crisis coefficient of 0.642 in model (1) imply about a 14% increase in analyst 
activity. This evidence of increased activity holds regardless of the measure of bad times used and whether we 
include the control variables.13  
Table X here 
We next use the number of pages in the analyst report to proxy for analyst effort. Unfortunately, this 
information is not recorded by I/B/E/S. We therefore hand collect these data from Thomson ONE from 1994 to 
September 2011, and from Thomson Eikon from October 2011 to December 2014 (Thomson recently migrated 
users of T1.com to Eikon, but both draw from the database formerly known as Investext). Without downloading 
the actual reports, one can download a spreadsheet of headlines (restricted to 50 observations at a time) that 
contain the broker name, covered firm name, report title, date, and number of pages in the report. To keep the 
data collection effort manageable, we download all the headlines for one large broker, Morgan Stanley, and 
                                                            
13 Increased analyst activity means there is less time between the reports that analysts issue. If becoming busier affects 
their performance, it may be important to control for analyst busyness. However, when we add a control for busyness, 
namely the log of the number of firms covered by the analyst, our result that analyst recommendation changes have more of 
an impact is unaffected (see the Internet Appendix).  
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hand match the firm names in the titles of the reports to CRSP. We end up with a large sample of 85,525 reports 
and, using this sample, we regress the number of pages in these reports on a bad times dummy and the following 
firm-level control variables: market Beta, Size quintile (based on NYSE breakpoints), Momentum quintile, BM 
quintile, and Stock Volatility (standard deviation of last month’s daily returns).14 We also add dummy variables 
indicating whether the report is issued within a trading day associated with an earnings announcement or 
earnings guidance event. Such reports might be of a different length because they contain additional information 
about the announcement in addition to the analyst’s own analysis.  
Table XI reports the results. Looking at model (1), we find that the average report length is 10.237 pages. In 
Crisis periods however, the report length increases by 1.336 pages, or 13%. This shows that reports issued in 
bad times typically contain more information. When we add the control variables in model (2), we find that 
reports are 1.552 pages longer than the good times predicted number of pages of 10.220. Note that this result 
controls for the firm’s recent volatility of daily stock returns. This implies that the longer report length is not due 
to an increase in firm-specific volatility but rather to the macroeconomic bad times. We see similar evidence of 
longer reports using the other measures of bad times, except for recessions. The overall evidence of longer 
reports is consistent with analysts exerting more effort in incorporating information in their reports, and hence 
provides an explanation for why analyst reports have more of an impact, in bad times.15, 16 
                                                            
14 This number of reports from one broker seems large in relation to our full sample because the Thomson research 
report databases contain all analyst reports, including reiterations, while databases such as I/B/E/S and First Call typically 
exclude reiterations (see e.g., Brav and Lehavy (2003)). We do not observe in the downloaded spreadsheets whether a 
report is a reiteration. However, because reiterations often occur on firm news days, we tried excluding all reports that 
occur on earnings announcement dates and earnings guidance dates (about one-third of the sample) and we continue to find 
that reports in bad times are longer (see the Internet Appendix).   
15 Li (2008) shows that managers also provide longer reports in bad times. Longer reports may not always mean better 
quality and quantity of information as Loughran and McDonald (2014) show that length might reduce the readability of 
financial reports. De Franco et al. (2015) also suggest that long analyst reports are less readable although they do not find 
that report length is negatively related to price impact. Our evidence of longer analyst reports is accompanied by evidence 
of increased impact, which is consistent with better quality information in the reports.  
16 We also test whether analysts more actively incorporate changes in the business cycle into their reports in bad times 
by using Thomson Eikon’s advanced search to manually count the fraction of reports from this broker that contain the 
words “macro” or “macroeconomic” in the 1994 to 2014 period. We choose a neutral business cycle word like “macro” 
because negative words like “recession” or “crisis” will mechanically be more frequent in bad times. We find that 16.5% of 
reports in Crisis periods have such words compared to 11.4% in non-Crisis periods, with the difference statistically 
significant. The other bad times measures usually see larger economic and statistical differences (e.g. bad times versus good 
times fractions for each bad times measures are, respectively, 21.2% versus 10.9% for Credit Crisis, 20.7% versus 11.2% 
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Table XI here 
We also look at analyst competition. The literature shows that analyst output quality increases with 
competition (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli (2017)). If analysts have 
incentives to work harder in bad times, this means that competition should be more intense, particularly for 
industries with more competition. We define an industry as competitive if it is in the highest quintile based on 
the prior-quarter number of analysts in the industry over the total market cap of the industry. In the Internet 
Appendix, we find that high competition is associated with a significantly greater impact of downgrades across 
all of our measures of bad times and irrespective of whether we include controls (and industry fixed effects). We 
do not find a significant impact of competition for upgrades.  
Overall, the results in this section show that analysts are more likely to lose their jobs in bad times, and in 
response analysts work harder. Evidence of increased effort comes from more frequent forecast revisions, longer 
reports, and from the fact that the increased impact of downgrades is higher in industries where analysts 
compete more. 
 C. Analyst Expertise Hypothesis 
Recent work in the mutual fund literature shows that managers use different skills in bad times compared to 
good times (see Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016)). Specifically, in bad times, market-
timing skills are more valuable than stock-picking skills because common factors that affect stock returns are 
more important for generating alpha. If analysts also demonstrate this change of skill in bad times, they might 
produce more of the type of information that is valuable across firms in bad times. There is some evidence that 
analysts can predict industry returns (e.g., Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) and Kadan et al. (2012)) and that analyst 
coverage at the industry level has spillover effects to the firm level (Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli (2017)). To 
detect the presence of common information in analyst reports, we examine whether analyst recommendation 
revisions on a firm spill over to other covered firms more in bad times compared to good times. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
for Recession, and 19.4% versus 7.2% for High Uncertainty). These results, though anecdotal, support the view that analyst 
behavior does indeed change over the business cycle. 
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For each recommendation change, we form a portfolio of peer firms that consist of firms that the analyst has 
issued a recommendation on in the last year. We then measure the two-day CAR of these peer firms (equally 
weighting the CAR for all peers) around the recommendation change, excluding peers that receive a 
recommendation from the same analyst on the same date. A typical recommendation change is associated with 
about 10 peer firms in our sample. Using this average peer CAR as the dependent variable, in the Internet 
Appendix we find in good times that downgrades are associated with a negative CAR for peer firms, which 
implies that revisions do spill over to other firms covered by the same analyst. When we consider whether this 
spillover increases in bad times, we find that the coefficients on Crisis, Credit Crisis, and Recession indeed 
show evidence that there is a greater spillover of downgrades to peer firms in bad times. For upgrades, however, 
we do not find that bad times increase the spillover effect of recommendations to peer firms. Overall, we find 
that only the negative information produced by analysts during bad times contains a common component. This 
evidence offers some support for the hypothesis that analysts display different skills in bad times. 
 D. Conflicts of Interest Hypothesis 
Another possible explanation for the greater impact of analysts in bad times is that potential conflicts of 
interest are less important in these times. We first examine the impact of bad times on an analyst’s optimism 
bias. If bad times reduce investment banking conflicts and if the optimism bias can be attributed to conflicts of 
interest, analyst forecast optimism should be lower in bad times. We capture an analyst’s optimism bias using 
the signed forecast error, which is the signed version of our absolute forecast error in Table VII. In the Internet 
Appendix, we find that the signed forecast error scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings is mostly 
insignificantly different in bad times from that in good times. However, when we scale the signed forecast error 
by prior volatility, we find that analysts are actually more optimistic in bad times than in good times. Hence, we 
find little evidence for the conflicts of interest prediction that analysts are less optimistic in bad times.  
Next, we identify the subset of brokers that have no investment banking business and compare the bad times 
impact of their analysts to the bad times impact of analysts employed by brokers with underwriting business. 
Using the I/B/E/S broker translation file to obtain broker names, we search for information about analyst’s 
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broker online to construct the variable Underwriter, which equals zero if we find unequivocal information that 
the broker is an independent broker with no investment banking business and one otherwise. We find that 
independent brokers are responsible for only about 10% of the recommendation changes in our sample. If a 
reduction in conflicts of interest is responsible for the increase in impact of analysts in bad times, independent 
brokers might not experience an increased impact given that they are not affected by the reduction of conflicts. 
To test this prediction, we interact the bad times dummies with Underwriter and reestimate the downgrade and 
upgrade CAR impact regressions. In the Internet Appendix, we find that in almost all cases, the coefficients on 
the bad times dummies are still strong and significant, which suggest that independent brokers also have more of 
an impact in bad times. This is inconsistent with the conflicts of interest hypothesis. For the interaction terms 
between the underwriter indicator and bad times, there is some evidence that brokers with underwriting business 
have more of an impact in bad times than independent brokers (about half of the specifications). While this 
seems to support the conflicts story, underwriter brokers also have more of an impact in good times than 
independent brokers. Taken together, these results imply that brokers with underwriting business generally have 
a greater impact than independent brokers, perhaps due to their larger size and more extensive resources. 
Consequently, there seems to be little support for the conflicts of interest explanation for why analysts have 
more of impact during bad times. 
 E. Overreaction Hypothesis  
Another explanation for analysts’ seemingly greater impact in bad times is that analysts do not really have 
more of an impact but rather investors simply overreact to analysts. Such overreaction might stem from the 
reduction in liquidity provision during bad times so investors have more of a price price impact when they trade 
in response to recommendations. Alternatively, overreaction could stem from arbitrageurs being more 
constrained in bad times, in which case they cannot trade against the overreaction by some investors. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we form daily-rebalanced calendar-time portfolios that buy stocks from 
trading day 2 following the revision to day 21, that is, a one-month drift. We follow the standard approach in 
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) when computing average daily returns, in which we place one dollar in 
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each revision, and the weight of the revised stock varies according to its cumulative return since entering the 
portfolio. The portfolio’s daily returns are compounded to monthly returns and regressed on the Carhart (1997) 
four factors plus a dummy variable for bad times. The bad times dummy is also interacted with each of the four 
factors to allow factor exposures to vary according to bad times. Consequently, the intercept measures the 
revision drift in good times, and the bad times dummy identifies whether the drift in bad times is statistically 
different from the good times drift. For each of our bad times measures, we have four portfolios—
recommendation downgrades, recommendation upgrades, downward forecast revisions, and upward forecast 
revisions—for a total of 16 portfolios.   
In the Internet Appendix, we find that the intercepts are all significantly negative for negative revisions and 
significantly positive for positive revisions, indicating that there is stock-price drift in response to analyst 
revisions in good times. However, the coefficients on the bad times dummies are statistically insignificant for 
almost all portfolios, which suggests that the bad times drift is statistically indistinguishable from the good times 
drift. When we add the intercept and the coefficients on bad times dummies to measure the stock-price drift of 
revisions in bad times, we do not find significant drift that is in the opposite direction of the revision. Overall, 
we do not find evidence that the larger stock-price impact of analysts in bad times is due to investor 
overreaction. 
 VI. Conclusion 
We assemble a large sample of analyst earnings forecasts and recommendations from 1983 to 2014 to 
examine the value of sell-side research in bad times. Using various measures of bad times, we find that analyst 
stock recommendation changes and earnings forecast revisions have more of an impact during bad times 
compared to good times. When we investigate the precision of analyst earnings forecasts, we find that, while 
forecasts are more imprecise using a traditional measure of forecast accuracy, a new measure of forecast 
accuracy that adjusts for the underlying uncertainty shows that analyst forecasts are actually more precise in bad 
times. We investigate various potential explanations for the increased impact of analysts in bad times and find 
that analyst incentives leading to increased effort and a greater reliance of investors on analysts in bad times 
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likely explain these results. We also show that downgrades by analysts in bad times have an increased negative 
impact on peer firms, indicating that analyst downgrades have a larger common component in bad times. 
Alternative possible explanations related to conflicts of interest or overreaction cannot account for our results.  
In sum, we show that the role of analysts in financial markets increases in importance during bad times 
because it is during these times when investors rely more on them and they work harder. The effect we 
document is economically significant. To gauge the change in firm value brought about by the increased impact 
of recommendations, we can use the typical recommendation change, which is associated with a market cap of 
approximately $8 billion (Panel C of Table I). The average increased CAR impact in Crisis times compared to 
good times is 1% for downgrades (0.6% for upgrades), which is equivalent to an $80 million increase in the 
impact of downgrades ($48 million for upgrades) on market cap. 
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Table I 
Change in Uncertainty during Bad Times  
Panel A reports the average daily VIX over bad times from 1990 to 2014. Panel B reports the average annualized implied volatility 
(Implvol, from 1996 to 2014) for the recommendation change sample measured five trading days before the recommendation event. 
Implied volatility is from the Option Metrics Volatility Surface file using the average of the interpolated implied volatility from puts and 
calls with 30 days to expiration and a delta of 50. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst’s current rating minus their prior 
outstanding rating (initiations and reiterations are excluded); changes made around earnings announcement and guidance days, and 
changes on multiple-recommendation days, are excluded. Bad times measures are as follows. Crisis: September to November 1987 (1987 
crisis), August to December 1998 (LTCM), and July 2007 to March 2009 (Credit Crisis). Recession (NBER recessions): July 1990 to 
March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 2009. High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the 
period 1983 to 2014) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) uncertainty index. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard 
errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the differences in VIX/implied 
volatility at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the recommendation change sample by 
downgrades and upgrades for Crisis and non-Crisis periods. CAR (in percent) is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return, where 
the benchmark is the return from a characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio. LFR is the analyst’s prior-year leader-follower ratio 
(computed from recommendations), Star Analyst is a dummy indicating whether the analyst is a star in the most recent Institutional 
Investor poll, Experience is the analyst’s experience (in quarters), Accuracy Quintile is the average forecast accuracy quintile of the 
analyst’s covered firms over the past year (quintile 5=most accurate), Broker Size is the number of analysts employed, # Analysts is the 
number of analysts covering the firm, Size is the firm’s market cap in the prior June, BM is the book-to-market ratio, Momentum is the 
month t–12 to t–2 buy-and-hold return, and Stock Volatility is the month t–1 volatility of daily stock returns. 
Panel A: VIX 
Bad Times Measure Variable  
Average Daily VIX (%) 
Bad Times Good Times Difference 
 Crisis VIX 31.339 18.865 12.474*** (21.56) 
  #Obs 547 5752    
Credit Crisis VIX 31.261 19.096 12.165*** (17.39) 
  #Obs 441 5858    
Recession VIX 29.899 18.558 11.341*** (26.50) 
  #Obs 772 5527    
High Uncertainty VIX 24.172 17.870 6.302*** (27.01) 
  #Obs 2205 3882     
 
Panel B: Implied Volatility before Recommendation Changes 
Bad Times Measure Rec-Change Variable 
Option-Implied Volatility in Annualized % 
Bad Times Good Times Difference  
Crisis Downgrade Implvol 60.820 47.319 13.501*** (13.62) 
    #Obs 8481 44841     
  Upgrade Implvol 57.949 45.923 12.027*** (12.73) 
    #Obs 7796 44660     
Credit Crisis Downgrade Implvol 61.264 47.671 13.593*** (11.71) 
    #Obs 7042 46280     
  Upgrade Implvol 58.307 46.176 12.130*** (11.23) 
    #Obs 6633 45823     
Recession Downgrade Implvol 67.104 46.083 21.021*** (24.37) 
    #Obs 8581 44741     
  Upgrade Implvol 63.834 45.076 18.758*** (23.46) 
    #Obs 7367 45089     
High Uncertainty Downgrade Implvol 52.392 47.783 4.609*** (7.58) 
    #Obs 22687 28983     
  Upgrade Implvol 50.112 46.624 3.488*** (6.49) 
    #Obs 21302 29295     
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Table I (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for the Recommendation Change Sample 
Variable 
Full Sample   Bad Times: Crisis Periods   Good Times: Non-Crisis Periods 
Mean Stdev #Obs   Mean Stdev #Obs   Mean Stdev #Obs 
Downgrade Sample 
CAR(%) -1.822 6.852 71,070  -2.678 9.216 9,648  -1.687 6.392 61,422 
LFR 2.377 2.880 66,386  2.307 2.930 9,052  2.388 2.872 57,334 
Star Analyst 0.130 0.336 71,070  0.109 0.312 9,648  0.133 0.340 61,422 
Experience (#qtrs) 27.33 20.53 71,070  28.17 20.16 9,648  27.20 20.58 61,422 
Accuracy Quintile 2.980 0.429 63,974  2.986 0.401 8,661  2.979 0.433 55,313 
Broker Size 50.82 49.33 71,070  50.93 54.27 9,648  50.80 48.51 61,422 
# Analysts Per Firm 9.642 6.397 71,070  9.288 5.819 9,648  9.697 6.481 61,422 
Size ($m) 7,940 25,124 71,070  9,372 27,443 9,648  7,716 24,733 61,422 
BM 0.512 0.636 71,070  0.454 0.436 9,648  0.521 0.661 61,422 
Momentum 0.132 0.671 71,070  -0.048 0.530 9,648  0.160 0.686 61,422 
Stock Volatility 0.031 0.022 71,069  0.041 0.026 9,648  0.029 0.020 61,421 
Upgrade Sample 
CAR(%) 2.123 6.095 67,425  2.658 6.768 8,688  2.044 5.985 58,737 
LFR 2.379 2.771 63,493  2.310 2.859 8,203  2.389 2.757 55,290 
Star Analyst 0.139 0.346 67,425  0.116 0.320 8,688  0.143 0.350 58,737 
Experience (#qtrs) 27.89 20.78 67,425  28.57 20.17 8,688  27.79 20.87 58,737 
Accuracy Quintile 2.981 0.417 60,759  2.989 0.390 7,838  2.980 0.420 52,921 
Broker Size 51.86 48.96 67,425  50.57 53.28 8,688  52.05 48.29 58,737 
# Analysts Per Firm 10.083 6.344 67,425  9.640 5.736 8,688  10.149 6.426 58,737 
Size ($m) 8,591 25,266 67,425  10,306 28,733 8,688  8,337 24,703 58,737 
BM 0.536 0.730 67,425  0.459 0.387 8,688  0.547 0.767 58,737 
Momentum 0.201 0.714 67,425  0.047 0.584 8,688  0.224 0.729 58,737 
Stock Volatility 0.029 0.020 67,424  0.036 0.024 8,688  0.027 0.019 58,736 
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Table II 
Recommendation Change Impact and Influential Likelihood in Bad Times 
In this table we present the two-day CAR (in percent), which is the average day [0,1] cumulative abnormal return, and influential 
probability, which is the percentage of influential recommendation changes. Influential changes are those whose two-day CAR is in the 
same direction as the recommendation change and is 1.96 times larger than expected based on the prior three-month idiosyncratic 
volatility of the stock (following Loh and Stulz (2011)). The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a characteristics-matched 
DGTW portfolio. The sample is from 1993 to 2014. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst’s current rating minus their prior 
outstanding rating (initiations and reiterations are excluded); changes made around earnings announcement and guidance days, and 
changes on multiple-recommendation days, are excluded. Bad times measures are as follows. Crisis: September to November 1987 (1987 
crisis), August to December 1998 (LTCM), and July 2007 to March 2009 (Credit Crisis). Recession (NBER recessions): July 1990 to 
March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 2009. High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the 
period 1983 to 2014) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) uncertainty index. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard 
errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
Bad Times 
Measure 
Rec-Change Variable 
Two-Day CAR (%)   Influential Probability (%) 
Bad Times Good Times Difference    Bad Times Good Times Difference  
Crisis Downgrade Percent -2.678*** -1.687*** -0.991***   15.278*** 11.681*** 3.596*** 
    t-stat (25.72) (55.18) (9.14)   (31.72) (71.51) (7.08) 
    #Obs 9648 61422     9648 61422   
  Upgrade Percent 2.658*** 2.044*** 0.614***   16.494*** 13.564*** 2.930*** 
    t-stat (27.86) (68.19) (6.15)   (24.48) (77.86) (4.21) 
    #Obs 8688 58737     8688 58737   
Credit Crisis Downgrade Percent -2.925*** -1.686*** -1.239***   16.273*** 11.664*** 4.609*** 
    t-stat (27.79) (54.70) (11.31)   (30.48) (72.27) (8.27) 
    #Obs 7792 63278     7792 63278   
  Upgrade Percent 2.804*** 2.041*** 0.764***   17.378*** 13.527*** 3.852*** 
    t-stat (26.15) (68.76) (6.87)   (22.16) (78.70) (4.80) 
    #Obs 7262 60163     7262 60163   
Recession Downgrade Percent -2.813*** -1.665*** -1.148***   13.589*** 11.945*** 1.644*** 
    t-stat (28.39) (54.31) (11.08)   (29.72) (71.91) (3.38) 
    #Obs 9714 61356     9714 61356   
  Upgrade Percent 2.992*** 2.003*** 0.989***   14.877*** 13.813*** 1.064* 
    t-stat (23.61) (72.06) (7.63)   (24.89) (76.32) (1.70) 
    #Obs 8147 59278     8147 59278   
High Uncertainty Downgrade Percent -2.134*** -1.638*** -0.495***   13.761*** 11.073*** 2.688*** 
    t-stat (38.84) (45.55) (7.55)   (51.39) (57.77) (8.16) 
    #Obs 26292 43059     26292 43059   
  Upgrade Percent 2.290*** 2.029*** 0.261***   14.989*** 13.115*** 1.873*** 
    t-stat (50.47) (52.86) (4.40)   (49.25) (61.10) (5.03) 
    #Obs 24038 41478     24038 41478   
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Table III 
Panel Regression of Recommendation Change CARs in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate the effect of bad times on recommendation two-day CARs (in percent) controlling for firm, analyst, and recommendation characteristics, from 1993 to 2014. A 
recommendation change is defined as the analyst’s current rating minus their prior outstanding rating (initiations and reiterations are excluded); changes made around earnings 
announcement and guidance days, and changes on multiple-recommendation days, are excluded. Bad times measures are described in Table I. For the control variables, LFR is the analyst’s 
prior-year leader-follower ratio, Star Analyst is a dummy indicating whether the analyst is a star in the most recent Institutional Investor poll, Relative Experience is the difference between 
the analyst’s experience (in quarters) against the average of peers who cover the same firm, Accuracy Quintile is the average forecast accuracy quintile of the analyst’s covered firms over 
the past year (quintile 5=most accurate), Broker Size is the number of analysts employed, # Analysts is the number of analysts covering the firm, Size is the firm’s market cap in the prior 
June, BM is the book-to-market ratio, Momentum is the month t–12 to t–2 buy-and-hold return, and Stock Volatility is the month t–1 volatility of daily stock returns. For the count variables 
Broker Size and # Analysts, we add one before taking logs. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) use the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Variable Dependent Variable: CAR of Downgrades   Dependent Variable: CAR of Upgrades 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Crisis -0.991*** -0.998***               0.614*** 0.639***             
  (9.14) (8.01)               (6.15) (5.19)             
Credit Crisis     -1.239*** -1.383***               0.764*** 0.878***         
      (11.31) (11.78)               (6.87) (6.23)         
Recession         -1.148*** -1.018***               0.989*** 0.838***     
          (11.08) (8.61)               (7.63) (5.96)     
High Uncertainty           -0.495*** -0.557***               0.261*** 0.383*** 
              (7.55) (7.68)               (4.40) (5.86) 
LFR   -0.036***   -0.036***   -0.035***   -0.033**     0.026***   0.026***   0.026***   0.025*** 
    (2.81)   (2.82)   (2.75)   (2.54)     (3.19)   (3.18)   (3.15)   (2.99) 
Star Analyst   -0.173**   -0.174**   -0.168**   -0.209**     0.048   0.048   0.046   0.082 
    (2.15)   (2.16)   (2.08)   (2.56)     (0.37)   (0.37)   (0.35)   (0.63) 
Relative Experience -0.007***   -0.007***   -0.007***   -0.007***     0.010***   0.010***   0.010***   0.009*** 
    (4.01)   (3.94)   (3.95)   (3.84)     (6.15)   (6.11)   (6.15)   (5.74) 
Accuracy Quintile -0.234***   -0.234***   -0.239***   -0.222***     0.299***   0.293***   0.298***   0.301*** 
    (3.54)   (3.53)   (3.61)   (3.32)     (4.30)   (4.21)   (4.29)   (4.23) 
Log Broker Size  -0.488***   -0.498***   -0.477***   -0.479***     0.523***   0.529***   0.517***   0.520*** 
    (15.18)   (15.73)   (15.05)   (14.80)     (14.97)   (15.00)   (15.19)   (14.88) 
Log # Analysts   0.214***   0.201***   0.233***   0.292***     -0.499***   -0.490***   -0.500***   -0.523*** 
    (2.83)   (2.65)   (3.07)   (3.77)     (8.18)   (8.05)   (8.20)   (8.46) 
Log Size   0.222***   0.236***   0.226***   0.206***     -0.365***   -0.372***   -0.376***   -0.357*** 
    (8.58)   (9.35)   (8.95)   (8.02)     (15.18)   (15.54)   (14.79)   (14.70) 
Log BM   0.135***   0.146***   0.132***   0.162***     0.045   0.041   0.043   0.031 
    (3.05)   (3.28)   (2.96)   (3.61)     (1.18)   (1.08)   (1.14)   (0.79) 
Momentum   -0.126*   -0.131**   -0.155**   -0.094     -0.159***   -0.155***   -0.131**   -0.171*** 
    (1.90)   (1.96)   (2.32)   (1.41)     (2.95)   (2.87)   (2.53)   (3.13) 
Stock Volatility   -20.864***  -20.447***  -19.364***  -22.774***    27.134***   26.806***   24.983***   28.953*** 
    (7.92)   (7.87)   (7.23)   (8.70)     (7.75)   (7.70)   (7.59)   (8.13) 
Intercept -1.687*** -2.095*** -1.686*** -2.219*** -1.665*** -2.257*** -1.638*** -1.953***   2.044*** 5.007*** 2.041*** 5.087*** 2.003*** 5.234*** 2.029*** 4.829*** 
  (55.18) (5.33) (54.70) (5.71) (54.31) (5.79) (45.55) (5.00)   (68.19) (13.37) (68.76) (13.60) (72.06) (13.48) (52.86) (12.67) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.687 -1.761 -1.686 -1.745 -1.665 -1.754 -1.638 -1.693   2.044 2.140 2.041 2.127 2.003 2.118 2.029 2.088 
#Obs 71070 59511 71070 59511 71070 59511 69351 58163   67425 56901 67425 56901 67425 56901 65516 55395 
Adj R-Sq 0.0024 0.0199 0.0032 0.0213 0.0033 0.0199 0.0012 0.0194   0.0011 0.0432 0.0015 0.0439 0.0028 0.0438 0.0004 0.0427 
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table IV 
Probit of Recommendation Change Influential Probability in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate probit regressions of the marginal effect (in percent) of bad times on the influential probability of the CAR for recommendation changes controlling for 
firm, analyst, and recommendation characteristics. Influential changes are those whose two-day CAR is in the same direction as the recommendation change and is 1.96 times 
larger than expected based on the prior three-month idiosyncratic volatility of the stock (following Loh and Stulz (2011)). The sample is from 1993 to 2014. A recommendation 
change is defined as the analyst’s current rating minus their prior outstanding rating (initiations and reiterations are excluded); changes made around earnings announcement and 
guidance days, and changes on multiple-recommendation days, are excluded. Definitions of bad times measures and control variables are described in Table I and Table III, 
respectively. z-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) use the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Variable Dependent Variable: Influential Dummy for Downgrades   Dependent Variable: Influential Dummy for Upgrades 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Crisis 0.036*** 0.065***              0.029*** 0.055***             
  (7.56) (12.02)               (4.45) (8.03)             
Credit Crisis     0.046*** 0.079***               0.039*** 0.067***         
      (9.00) (13.30)               (5.15) (8.60)         
Recession         0.016*** 0.048***               0.011* 0.042***     
          (3.49) (8.65)               (1.74) (6.29)     
High Uncertainty           0.027*** 0.040***               0.019*** 0.032*** 
              (8.30) (11.50)               (5.09) (8.31) 
LFR   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***     0.001**   0.001**   0.001**   0.001** 
    (3.42)   (3.42)   (3.35)   (3.02)     (2.50)   (2.47)   (2.46)   (2.27) 
Star Analyst   -0.002   -0.002   -0.003   0.000     -0.014***   -0.014***   -0.014***   -0.012*** 
    (0.52)   (0.51)   (0.67)   (0.06)     (3.04)   (3.03)   (3.14)   (2.63) 
Relative Experience 0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   0.000***     0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001*** 
    (4.46)   (4.41)   (4.44)   (3.77)     (6.86)   (6.86)   (6.90)   (5.71) 
Accuracy Quintile 0.018***   0.018***   0.019***   0.017***     0.015***   0.015***   0.015***   0.016*** 
    (5.56)   (5.58)   (5.65)   (5.19)     (4.20)   (4.12)   (4.25)   (4.49) 
Log Broker Size  0.030***   0.030***   0.030***   0.029***     0.034***   0.035***   0.034***   0.034*** 
    (19.61)   (19.85)   (19.14)   (18.76)     (19.73)   (19.82)   (19.48)   (19.71) 
Log # Analysts   -0.006***  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.006***    -0.051***   -0.050***   -0.052***   -0.051*** 
    (5.12)   (5.41)   (4.77)   (4.76)     (15.12)   (15.05)   (15.32)   (15.02) 
Log Size   -0.006***  -0.007***  -0.006***  -0.006***    -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.012*** 
    (5.12)   (5.41)   (4.77)   (4.76)     (8.84)   (9.09)   (8.46)   (8.31) 
Log BM   -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.007***    0.002   0.002   0.002   0.001 
    (2.70)   (2.95)   (2.72)   (3.64)     (1.13)   (1.01)   (0.98)   (0.26) 
Momentum   0.008***   0.008***   0.008***   0.007***     -0.007**   -0.006**   -0.006**   -0.007*** 
    (3.77)   (3.77)   (3.93)   (3.17)     (2.49)   (2.45)   (2.37)   (2.82) 
Stock Volatility   -1.288***  -1.273***  -1.296***  -1.182***    -1.704***   -1.700***   -1.729***   -1.550*** 
    (13.25)   (13.22)   (12.98)   (12.23)     (13.47)   (13.48)   (13.85)   (12.28) 
Predicted Prob.   0.121 0.117 0.121 0.117 0.122 0.118 0.120 0.117   0.139 0.134 0.139 0.134 0.139 0.135 0.138 0.134 
#Obs 71070 59511 71070 59511 71070 59511 69351 58163   67425 56901 67425 56901 67425 56901 65516 55395 
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table V 
Probit of Earnings Forecast Revision Influential Probability in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate probit regressions of the marginal effect (in percent) of bad times on the influential probability of the CAR for earnings forecast revisions controlling for 
firm, analyst, and forecast characteristics. Influential revisions are those whose two-day CAR is in the same direction as the revision and is 1.96 times larger than expected based 
on the prior three-month idiosyncratic volatility of the stock (following Loh and Stulz (2011)). The sample is from 1983 to 2014. A forecast revision is defined as the analyst’s 
current one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast minus their prior outstanding forecast (i.e., initiations are excluded) scaled by price; and revisions made around earnings announcement 
and guidance days, and revisions on multiple-forecast days, are excluded. Definitions of bad times measures and control variables are described in Table I and Table III, 
respectively. An additional control here is Forecast Revision, which is the analyst’s current forecast minus prior forecast, scaled by the stock price. z-statistics (in absolute values 
and based on standard errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed 
effects (F.E.) use the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Influential Dummy for Downward Revisions   Dependent Variable: Influential Dummy for Upward Revisions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Crisis 0.025*** 0.036***              0.017*** 0.024***             
  (8.89) (10.96)               (5.85) (6.57)             
Credit Crisis     0.029*** 0.042***               0.020*** 0.025***         
      (9.25) (11.51)               (6.28) (6.43)         
Recession         0.016*** 0.028***               0.005* 0.010***     
          (6.16) (8.82)               (1.77) (2.63)     
High Uncertainty           0.011*** 0.016***               0.004** 0.006*** 
              (7.00) (9.28)               (2.57) (2.77) 
Forecast Revision -0.340***  -0.334***  -0.338***  -0.321***    0.740***   0.725***   0.746***   0.676** 
 
  (4.48)   (4.43)   (4.43)   (4.17)     (2.70)   (2.65)   (2.72)   (2.41) 
LFR   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***     0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001*** 
    (4.83)   (4.71)   (5.42)   (5.96)     (4.92)   (4.86)   (5.11)   (5.27) 
Star Analyst   -0.000   -0.000   -0.001   -0.000     -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   -0.002 
    (0.17)   (0.13)   (0.61)   (0.05)     (0.61)   (0.60)   (0.83)   (0.67) 
Relative Experience 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000     0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
    (0.60)   (0.64)   (0.58)   (0.69)     (1.19)   (1.20)   (1.25)   (1.33) 
Accuracy Quintile 0.002   0.002   0.002   0.001     0.003*   0.003*   0.003*   0.003* 
    (1.36)   (1.40)   (1.43)   (0.71)     (1.92)   (1.93)   (1.91)   (1.76) 
Log Broker Size  0.003***   0.003***   0.003***   0.004***     0.004***   0.004***   0.004***   0.004*** 
    (3.92)   (4.00)   (4.04)   (4.64)     (4.07)   (4.06)   (4.16)   (3.93) 
Log # Analysts   -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001   -0.001     -0.015***   -0.015***   -0.016***   -0.018*** 
    (1.90)   (2.05)   (1.54)   (0.73)     (5.77)   (5.87)   (6.19)   (6.43) 
Log Size   -0.001*   -0.001**   -0.001   -0.001     -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.003***   -0.002** 
    (1.90)   (2.05)   (1.54)   (0.73)     (3.57)   (3.51)   (3.02)   (2.48) 
Log BM   -0.001   -0.002*   -0.002   -0.002**     -0.003**   -0.003**   -0.003**   -0.003** 
    (1.45)   (1.67)   (1.59)   (2.34)     (2.25)   (2.28)   (2.47)   (2.54) 
Momentum   0.005***   0.005***   0.005***   0.002     0.001   0.001   0.001   0.000 
    (3.54)   (3.52)   (3.75)   (1.41)     (0.68)   (0.66)   (0.41)   (0.08) 
Stock Volatility   -0.501***  -0.504***  -0.501***  -0.326***    -0.601***   -0.588***   -0.557***   -0.480*** 
    (7.44)   (7.61)   (7.16)   (4.77)     (7.24)   (7.15)   (6.62)   (5.83) 
Predicted Prob.   0.049 0.045 0.049 0.045 0.049 0.045 0.048 0.044   0.053 0.050 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.051 
#Obs 172481 105097 172481 105097 172481 105097 164256 99663   112147 69773 112147 69773 112147 69773 107045 66470 
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table VI 
Robustness Tests 
In Panel A we estimate the effect of high firm, industry, and market uncertainty on the two-day CAR (in percent) of recommendation changes. Control variables for analyst 
characteristics are included in even specifications but not reported. Definitions of bad times measures and control variables are described in Table I and Table III, respectively. The total 
variance of a firm’s daily stock returns in the prior month is decomposed into market, industry, and firm components by regressing daily returns on market returns and market-purged 
industry returns (Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification). High Uncertainty equals one when the relevant component is in the top tercile of the firm’s time-series of monthly 
variance components. In Panel B we estimate the effect of bad times on the two-day CAR (in percent) of recommendation reiterations. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return 
from a characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio. The sample is from 1993 to 2014. A recommendation reiteration is either an explicit reiteration from the I/B/E/S recommendation file 
or an assumed reiteration—the analyst’s outstanding rating is assumed to be reiterated when there is a quarterly earnings or target price forecast with no new rating issued. A reiteration 
is defined as unfavorable (favorable) if the outstanding rating is a hold or sell (buy). Control variables (in even specifications but not reported) are the same as in Table III plus forecast 
revision over price and target price over current price when available or zero otherwise. Reiterations made around earnings announcement and guidance days, and reiterations on 
multiple-reiteration days, are excluded. In Panel C we regress the daily absolute returns of firms in the CRSP file from 1993 to 2014 on firm news event dummies and bad times 
dummies, excluding observations for which the lagged price is less than one dollar. Event dummies equal one for day 0 of the announcement, or day 1 if the announcement occurs after 
trading hours (for cases in which we have time stamps to verify this). Earnings announcement dates are from Compustat and times from I/B/E/S, guidance events are from First Call 
Guidelines (I/B/E/S Guidance from 2011 onwards), dividend events are from the CRSP event file, and insider trades are from the Thomson Insider Form 4 file. Size, BM, and Momentum 
are defined in Table III. The control variables Lag Return, Idio. Volatility, Turnover, and Inst. Ownership are measured in the prior month. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on 
standard errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) use 
the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Panel A: Panel Regression of Recommendation Change CAR on Different Measures of High Uncertainty 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR of Downgrades    Dependent Variable: CAR of Upgrades  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
High Firm Uncertainty -0.171*** -0.208***        -0.036 -0.067   0.523*** 0.509***         0.472*** 0.446*** 
  (2.74) (3.05)         (0.57) (0.96)   (8.36) (7.45)         (7.56) (6.61) 
High Ind. Uncertainty     -0.167*** -0.162***    -0.074 -0.051       0.130** 0.149**     -0.038 -0.016 
      (3.01) (2.67)     (1.31) (0.82)       (2.37) (2.43)     (0.71) (0.27) 
High Mkt Uncertainty         -0.457*** -0.505*** -0.434*** -0.479***           0.362*** 0.388*** 0.267*** 0.294*** 
          (7.48) (7.54) (6.91) (6.95)           (6.77) (6.66) (4.73) (4.75) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.764 -1.838 -1.760 -1.850 -1.649 -1.718 -1.618 -1.686   1.953 2.064 2.076 2.176 1.989 2.086 1.885 1.981 
#Obs 71067 60699 71067 60699 71067 60699 71067 60699   67424 58030 67424 58030 67424 58030 67424 58030 
Adj R-Sq 0.0001 0.0068 0.0001 0.0067 0.0010 0.0079 0.0010 0.0079   0.0016 0.0134 0.0001 0.0121 0.0008 0.0129 0.0020 0.0139 
Controls, Ind. F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Panel B: Panel Regression of Reiteration CAR in Bad Times 
Variables  
Dependent Variable: CAR of Unfavorable Recommendation Reiterations   Dependent Variable: CAR of Favorable Recommendation Reiterations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Crisis -0.262*** -0.173***              -0.163*** -0.105**             
  (5.72) (3.78)               (3.52) (2.39)             
Credit Crisis     -0.293*** -0.215***              -0.163*** -0.110**         
      (6.02) (4.45)               (3.12) (2.21)         
Recession         -0.252*** -0.164***              -0.167*** -0.131***     
          (5.36) (3.42)               (3.83) (3.06)     
High Uncertainty             -0.090*** -0.100***              -0.021 -0.029 
              (3.79) (4.23)               (0.91) (1.29) 
Good Times Ŷ -0.064 -0.076 -0.064 -0.073 -0.065 -0.077 -0.060 -0.056   0.175 0.166 0.171 0.164 0.178 0.171 0.164 0.164 
#Obs 248676 243190 248676 243190 248676 243190 237063 231964   347922 339883 347922 339883 347922 339883 334452 326827 
Adj R-Sq 0.0004 0.0024 0.0005 0.0024 0.0004 0.0023 0.0001 0.0023   0.0001 0.0023 0.0001 0.0023 0.0001 0.0023 0.0000 0.0023 
Controls, Ind. F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table VI (Cont’d) 
Panel C: Regression of Firm-Day Absolute Returns on Firm News Events and Bad Times 
Variable 
Bad Times: Crisis   Bad Times: Credit Crisis   Bad Times: Recession   Bad Times: High Uncertainty 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   (10) (11) (12) 
BadTimes 0.471*** 0.432*** 0.411***   0.185*** 0.380*** 0.353***   0.517*** 0.416*** 0.395***   -0.179*** 0.098*** 0.090*** 
  (11.75) (15.96) (15.19)   (4.31) (11.83) (10.98)   (16.24) (15.83) (15.10)   (7.78) (7.30) (6.67) 
Recchg Dum 1.656*** 2.020*** 2.028***   1.652*** 2.022*** 2.030***   1.630*** 2.002*** 2.012***   1.506*** 1.936*** 1.947*** 
  (67.10) (97.96) (98.84)   (67.90) (99.15) (99.91)   (66.95) (98.71) (99.69)   (50.09) (75.37) (76.95) 
Reiteration Dum   0.704*** 0.672***     0.702*** 0.660***     0.701*** 0.662***     0.693*** 0.606*** 
    (91.30) (86.11)     (90.86) (85.75)     (91.18) (84.57)     (87.24) (62.70) 
Earn Annc Dum   1.221*** 1.191***     1.220*** 1.197***     1.220*** 1.195***     1.227*** 1.190*** 
    (80.29) (76.37)     (79.28) (75.44)     (79.80) (75.77)     (78.59) (66.90) 
Guidance Dum   1.730*** 1.753***     1.729*** 1.808***     1.726*** 1.746***     1.780*** 2.069*** 
    (44.26) (41.90)     (44.18) (42.41)     (44.31) (40.76)     (44.15) (35.78) 
Dividend Dum   -0.138*** -0.149***   -0.138*** -0.155***     -0.136*** -0.140***     -0.135*** -0.142*** 
    (17.09) (18.09)     (17.17) (19.05)     (16.85) (16.96)     (16.11) (14.16) 
Insider Trade Dum   -0.099*** -0.101***   -0.101*** -0.104***     -0.094*** -0.099***     -0.100*** -0.106*** 
    (13.88) (13.61)     (14.03) (13.88)     (13.03) (13.20)     (13.59) (11.50) 
Insider File Dum   0.261*** 0.253***     0.262*** 0.262***     0.259*** 0.256***     0.262*** 0.267*** 
    (43.27) (44.46)     (43.12) (41.88)     (42.74) (41.01)     (41.91) (35.55) 
BadTimes×Recchg Dum 0.503*** 0.439*** 0.370***   0.726*** 0.516*** 0.430***   0.712*** 0.592*** 0.509***   0.575*** 0.353*** 0.320*** 
  (6.79) (6.70) (5.96)   (9.11) (7.20) (6.38)   (9.49) (8.69) (7.82)   (12.11) (8.48) (8.06) 
BadTimes×Reiteration Dum   0.259***       0.407***       0.296***       0.219*** 
      (8.46)       (13.40)       (10.69)       (12.58) 
BadTimes×Earn Annc Dum   0.319***       0.367***       0.249***       0.131*** 
      (5.43)       (5.87)       (4.32)       (3.66) 
BadTimes×Guidance Dum     -0.254**       -0.888***       -0.187*       -0.703*** 
      (2.20)       (10.48)       (1.92)       (8.87) 
BadTimes×Dividend Dum     0.113***       0.203***       0.043       0.020 
      (3.27)       (5.28)       (1.25)       (1.07) 
BadTimes×Insider Trade Dum   0.005       0.036       0.044       0.015 
      (0.18)       (1.46)       (1.51)       (0.95) 
BadTimes×Insider File Dum   0.081***       -0.003       0.030       -0.016 
      (2.61)       (0.12)       (1.36)       (1.23) 
Log Size   -0.194*** -0.194***   -0.193*** -0.192***     -0.196*** -0.196***     -0.193*** -0.193*** 
    (117.79) (117.83)     (118.10) (118.12)     (117.40) (117.41)     (115.07) (115.12) 
Log BM   -0.123*** -0.123***   -0.125*** -0.125***     -0.128*** -0.128***     -0.132*** -0.132*** 
    (54.57) (54.61)     (55.34) (55.38)     (58.79) (58.74)     (60.08) (60.06) 
Momentum   -0.014*** -0.014***   -0.018*** -0.018***     -0.010** -0.010**     -0.025*** -0.025*** 
    (2.73) (2.72)     (3.57) (3.56)     (2.04) (2.03)     (4.82) (4.81) 
Lag Return   -1.157*** -1.156***   -1.177*** -1.176***     -1.172*** -1.171***     -1.210*** -1.209*** 
    (41.93) (41.94)     (41.86) (41.87)     (41.87) (41.90)     (42.45) (42.46) 
Idio. Volatility   35.031*** 35.030***   35.324*** 35.317***     34.846*** 34.842***   35.788*** 35.787*** 
    (110.75) (110.76)     (110.89) (110.90)     (107.69) (107.74)     (109.44) (109.47) 
Turnover   -4.391*** -4.412***   -4.548*** -4.573***     -4.248*** -4.277***     -4.473*** -4.507*** 
    (19.16) (19.27)     (19.96) (20.08)     (18.59) (18.76)     (18.66) (18.81) 
Inst. Ownership   -0.530*** -0.530***   -0.533*** -0.533***     -0.520*** -0.520***     -0.497*** -0.497*** 
    (64.62) (64.55)     (68.99) (68.85)     (59.34) (59.31)     (54.26) (54.14) 
Intercept 2.381*** 3.865*** 3.865***   2.413*** 3.857*** 3.858***   2.375*** 3.892*** 3.893***   2.512*** 3.827*** 3.829*** 
  (237.99) (139.36) (139.41)   (235.87) (138.54) (138.60)   (228.36) (137.57) (137.62)   (224.73) (133.76) (133.92) 
#Obs 21139679 20120657 20120657   21139679 20120657 20120657   21139679 20120657 20120657   20495984 19525767 19525767 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-Sq 0.0158 0.1344 0.1344   0.0144 0.1338 0.1339   0.0163 0.1343 0.1344   0.0148 0.1326 0.1327 
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Table VII 
Absolute Forecast Errors in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate the effect of bad times on an analyst’s absolute forecast error (in percent). Absolute forecast error is actual minus forecasted quarterly earnings, divided by the 
absolute value of actual earnings in models (1) to (8) (denominators less than $0.25 are set to $0.25), or by the daily stock return volatility (annualized) in the month before the forecast 
in models (9) to (16). Forecast errors are winsorized at the extreme 1% before taking absolute values. Only forecasts that are revisions of prior forecasts are included. Definitions of bad 
times measures are provided in Table I. Control variables definitions are similar to those in Table III. Additional controls specific to forecasts are also included. Optimistic Forecast is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the forecast is above the final consensus, Days to Annc is the number of days from the forecast to the next earnings announcement date, Multiple 
Forecast Day is a dummy indicating whether more than one analyst issued a forecast on that day, and Dispersion is the dispersion of forecasts making up the final consensus. For the 
count variables Broker Size, # Analysts, and Days to Annc, we add one before taking logs. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard errors clustered by industry-quarter) are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) use the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry 
classification. 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Absolute Forecast Error Scaled by Absolute Value of Actual Earnings  Dependent Variable: Absolute Forecast Error Scaled by Stock Volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Crisis 2.775*** 2.952***              -6.667*** -6.705***             
  (5.11) (6.96)               (6.87) (9.21)             
Credit Crisis     3.341*** 3.626***               -5.417*** -5.590***         
      (5.49) (7.81)               (5.05) (7.15)         
Recession         2.807*** 2.985***               -7.933*** -7.234***     
          (5.11) (7.14)               (8.44) (10.02)     
High Uncertainty             1.128*** 0.996***               0.828 -1.015* 
              (4.01) (4.41)               (1.08) (1.82) 
Optimistic Forecast -0.090   -0.104   -0.075   -0.064     -1.325***   -1.309***   -1.359***   -1.196*** 
    (0.80)   (0.93)   (0.66)   (0.55)     (5.68)   (5.61)   (5.87)   (5.16) 
LFR   -0.209***   -0.212***   -0.203***   -0.196***     -0.492***   -0.494***   -0.504***   -0.498*** 
    (14.17)   (14.39)   (13.75)   (13.03)     (14.63)   (14.67)   (14.98)   (14.44) 
Star Analyst   0.793***   0.808***   0.764***   0.868***     2.620***   2.651***   2.679***   2.953*** 
    (6.72)   (6.85)   (6.47)   (7.20)     (9.52)   (9.62)   (9.75)   (10.92) 
Relative Experience -0.008***   -0.008***   -0.008***   -0.008***     -0.026***   -0.026***   -0.026***   -0.023*** 
    (4.29)   (4.31)   (4.27)   (4.10)     (5.09)   (5.10)   (5.12)   (4.51) 
Accuracy Quintile  -0.801***   -0.798***   -0.794***   -0.787***     -0.973***   -0.970***   -0.990***   -0.827*** 
    (11.19)   (11.17)   (11.11)   (10.68)     (6.40)   (6.36)   (6.52)   (5.44) 
Log Days to Annc  1.219***   1.232***   1.220***   1.207***     1.052***   1.024***   1.052***   1.095*** 
    (19.01)   (19.07)   (19.05)   (18.47)     (7.58)   (7.37)   (7.63)   (7.78) 
Mutiple Forecast Day -1.561***   -1.551***   -1.596***   -1.569***     -2.629***   -2.637***   -2.546***   -2.549*** 
    (14.33)   (14.25)   (14.49)   (13.93)     (10.49)   (10.52)   (10.23)   (10.24) 
Log Broker Size   -0.305***   -0.300***   -0.316***   -0.335***     -0.506***   -0.522***   -0.476***   -0.640*** 
    (5.12)   (5.07)   (5.20)   (5.29)     (3.96)   (4.07)   (3.78)   (5.00) 
Log # Analysts   0.756***   0.752***   0.765***   0.415     -2.876***   -2.712***   -2.931***   -1.985*** 
    (2.95)   (2.94)   (3.00)   (1.50)     (4.71)   (4.44)   (4.85)   (3.33) 
Log Size   -1.969***   -1.979***   -1.966***   -1.886***     4.107***   4.081***   4.110***   3.630*** 
    (27.10)   (27.43)   (27.13)   (24.72)     (16.79)   (16.68)   (16.99)   (15.46) 
Log BM   2.579***   2.568***   2.608***   2.530***     7.164***   7.216***   7.086***   7.527*** 
    (20.09)   (20.04)   (20.37)   (18.64)     (24.50)   (24.57)   (24.03)   (24.76) 
Momentum   -2.259***   -2.233***   -2.104***   -2.540***     0.775**   0.917**   0.360   1.175*** 
    (10.91)   (10.85)   (10.62)   (11.27)     (1.99)   (2.33)   (0.99)   (2.93) 
Dispersion   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000     -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000 
    (1.46)   (1.46)   (1.47)   (1.48)     (0.35)   (0.32)   (0.36)   (0.30) 
Intercept  14.835*** 45.065*** 14.829*** 45.148*** 14.759*** 44.948*** 14.700*** 44.618***   26.852*** -16.951*** 26.616*** -17.075*** 27.199*** -16.669*** 25.123*** -13.060*** 
  (104.43) (49.53) (105.20) (49.77) (106.84) (49.73) (90.89) (48.64)   (63.64) (6.13) (63.71) (6.17) (65.12) (6.06) (53.27) (4.78) 
Good Times Ŷ 14.835 13.905 14.829 13.884 14.759 13.826 14.700 13.838   26.852 26.728 26.616 26.509 27.199 26.971 25.123 25.720 
#Obs  406644 334974 406644 334974 406644 334974 388570 318887   406642 334973 406642 334973 406642 334973 388568 318886 
Adj R-Sq 0.0017 0.0786 0.0022 0.0793 0.0021 0.0789 0.0007 0.0763   0.0025 0.0824 0.0014 0.0814 0.0042 0.0833 0.0001 0.0807 
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table VIII 
Cross-Sectional Tests of CAR Impact of Recommendation Changes in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate panel regressions of the effect of bad times on the two-day CAR (in percent) of recommendation downgrades (in models (1) to (8)) and upgrades (in models (9) 
to (16)) with firm characteristics interactions. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio. The sample is from 1993 to 2014. A 
recommendation change is defined as the analyst’s current rating minus their prior outstanding rating (initiations and reiterations are excluded); changes made around earnings 
announcement and guidance days, and changes on multiple-recommendation days, are excluded. Definitions of bad times measures are provided in Table I. The firm characteristics 
dummies are as follows. NoGuidance (Panel A) equals one for firms with no earnings guidance in the prior month. LowIO (Panel B) equals one for the lowest quintile 13F-reported 
fraction of shares owned by institutions. HighIVOLfrac (Panel C) equals one for the highest quintile of stocks sorted on the prior month’s fraction of firm-specific daily return volatility 
over total volatility (estimated by regressing daily returns on market returns and market-purged industry returns). SmallSize (Panel D) equals one for the lowest NYSE-breakpoint 
quintile rank of the firm’s market cap in the prior June. NoOptions (Panel E, 1996 to 2014) equals one when the firm has no data in Option Metrics. LowCoverage (Panel F) equals one 
for the lowest analyst coverage quintile based on number of analysts issuing recommendations in the prior quarter. Control variables (coefficients unreported) are the same as in Table III, 
except that the relevant control is dropped when it is related to the firm characteristic dummy (e.g., Size is dropped in the SmallSize panel). t-statistics (in absolute values and based on 
standard errors clustered by calendar day) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) use 
the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR of Downgrades   Dependent Variable: CAR of Upgrades 
Crisis   Credit Crisis   Recession   High Uncertainty   Crisis   Credit Crisis   Recession   High Uncertainty 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12)   (13) (14)   (15) (16) 
Panel A: No Guidance Firms Interacted with Bad Times 
BadTimes -0.515*** -0.485**   -0.670*** -0.749***   -0.485*** -0.254   -0.163 -0.117   0.525*** 0.487***   0.509*** 0.464***   0.577*** 0.252   -0.116 -0.055 
  (2.89) (2.47)   (3.73) (3.87)   (2.93) (1.36)   (1.45) (0.94)   (3.21) (2.81)   (3.05) (2.62)   (3.45) (1.40)   (1.15) (0.52) 
NoGuidance -0.466*** -0.388***   -0.475*** -0.392***   -0.443*** -0.340***   -0.399*** -0.277***   0.262*** 0.083   0.249*** 0.057   0.225*** 0.014   0.086 -0.108 
  (7.35) (5.46)   (7.41) (5.46)   (6.92) (4.73)   (5.05) (3.11)   (4.52) (1.36)   (4.30) (0.94)   (4.05) (0.24)   (1.17) (1.41) 
BadTimes×NoGuidance -0.561*** -0.605***   -0.682*** -0.758***   -0.805*** -0.925***   -0.405*** -0.525***   0.115 0.184   0.326 0.510**   0.510** 0.716***   0.462*** 0.526*** 
  (2.59) (2.60)   (3.09) (3.22)   (3.94) (4.20)   (3.10) (3.65)   (0.60) (0.89)   (1.62) (2.28)   (2.28) (2.94)   (3.95) (4.21) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.752 -1.831   -1.748 -1.815   -1.756 -1.861   -1.764 -1.860 
 
2.055 2.159   2.068 2.172   2.053 2.191   2.167 2.247 
#Obs 71087 59524   71087 59524   71087 59524   69368 58176  67436 56908   67436 56908   67436 56908   65527 55402 
Adj R-Sq 0.0032 0.0205   0.0040 0.0220   0.0043 0.0208   0.0021 0.0201   0.0014 0.0432   0.0018 0.0440   0.0031 0.0440   0.0008 0.0429 
Panel B: Low Institutional Ownership Firms Interacted with Bad Times 
BadTimes -0.965*** -0.980***   -1.204*** -1.356***   -1.129*** -1.006***   -0.486*** -0.544***   0.617*** 0.649***   0.757*** 0.879***   0.987*** 0.840***   0.264*** 0.384*** 
  (8.92) (7.86)   (11.01) (11.52)   (10.89) (8.48)   (7.36) (7.47)   (6.15) (5.23)   (6.77) (6.20)   (7.56) (5.93)   (4.42) (5.84) 
LowIO -0.241 0.067   -0.232 0.099   -0.375 -0.061   0.060 0.611   0.183 0.529   0.007 0.248   0.077 0.222   0.089 0.001 
  (0.63) (0.12)   (0.62) (0.19)   (0.97) (0.11)   (0.17) (1.15)   (0.32) (0.51)   (0.01) (0.25)   (0.14) (0.21)   (0.11) (0.00) 
BadTimes×LowIO -3.829* -5.202*   -5.472** -7.141*   -3.524 -5.814   -1.652 -3.516**   -0.489 -2.660   1.174 -0.301   0.489 -0.042   0.027 0.551 
  (1.89) (1.65)   (2.12) (1.80)   (1.59) (1.51)   (1.61) (2.09)   (0.37) (1.34)   (0.84) (0.14)   (0.36) (0.02)   (0.03) (0.30) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.688 -1.761   -1.688 -1.745   -1.665 -1.753   -1.642 -1.697 
 
2.045 2.140   2.043 2.129   2.006 2.120   2.030 2.089 
#Obs 70688 59224   70688 59224   70688 59224   69083 57959  67092 56657   67092 56657   67092 56657   65265 55213 
Adj R-Sq 0.0028 0.0202   0.0037 0.0218   0.0036 0.0203   0.0013 0.0196   0.0011 0.0433   0.0015 0.0439   0.0028 0.0438   0.0004 0.0427 
Panel C: High IVOL Fraction Firms Interacted with Bad Times 
BadTimes -0.942*** -1.197***   -1.157*** -1.531***   -1.128*** -1.314***   -0.506*** -0.698***   0.562*** 0.861***   0.703*** 1.073***   0.997*** 1.202***   0.253*** 0.493*** 
  (8.72) (9.71)   (10.84) (13.19)   (11.29) (11.87)   (7.68) (9.46)   (5.76) (7.50)   (6.52) (8.19)   (7.60) (7.91)   (4.27) (7.75) 
HighIVOLfrac -0.293*** 0.036   -0.279** 0.059   -0.352*** -0.020   -0.375*** -0.102   0.512*** -0.303***   0.519*** -0.305***   0.621*** -0.238**   0.510*** -0.278** 
  (2.62) (0.28)   (2.52) (0.46)   (3.21) (0.16)   (2.98) (0.73)   (5.03) (2.69)   (5.17) (2.73)   (6.19) (2.18)   (4.37) (2.09) 
BadTimes×HighIVOLfrac -1.022* -0.987   -1.790*** -1.814**   -0.694 -0.645   -0.043 0.113   1.004** 0.970*   1.282** 1.359**   0.170 0.611   0.336 0.219 
  (1.86) (1.57)   (2.60) (2.33)   (1.08) (0.87)   (0.16) (0.35)   (2.28) (1.88)   (2.41) (2.15)   (0.34) (1.04)   (1.37) (0.86) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.694 -1.734   -1.695 -1.729   -1.667 -1.713   -1.634 -1.640 
 
2.051 2.111   2.047 2.106   2.002 2.073   2.031 2.048 
#Obs 71084 59523   71084 59523   71084 59523   69365 58175  67435 56908   67435 56908   67435 56908   65526 55402 
Adj R-Sq 0.0028 0.0166   0.0038 0.0182   0.0036 0.0171   0.0014 0.0152   0.0020 0.0376   0.0025 0.0385   0.0036 0.0393   0.0011 0.0360 
Controls, Ind. F.E. No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes 
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Table VIII (Cont’d) 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: CAR of Downgrades   Dependent Variable: CAR of Upgrades 
Crisis   Credit Crisis   Recession   High Uncertainty   Crisis   Credit Crisis   Recession   High Uncertainty 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12)   (13) (14)   (15) (16) 
Panel D: Small Size Firms Interacted with Bad Times 
BadTimes -0.794*** -0.806***   -0.881*** -0.977***   -0.919*** -0.723***   -0.486*** -0.507***   0.485*** 0.386***   0.554*** 0.497***   0.763*** 0.388***   0.191*** 0.198*** 
  (8.98) (8.41)   (9.32) (9.65)   (9.65) (6.64)   (8.31) (8.25)   (5.54) (3.57)   (5.77) (4.06)   (8.29) (3.54)   (3.72) (3.59) 
SmallSize -0.914*** -0.669***   -0.843*** -0.547***   -0.888*** -0.605***   -0.974*** -0.746***   2.030*** 1.440***   1.990*** 1.374***   1.923*** 1.286***   1.861*** 1.269*** 
  (9.05) (5.32)   (8.04) (4.20)   (8.56) (4.71)   (8.99) (5.61)   (18.06) (11.11)   (17.96) (10.71)   (21.83) (11.76)   (13.78) (8.09) 
BadTimes×SmallSize -0.812** -0.394   -1.624*** -1.344***   -1.520*** -1.262***   -0.249 0.000   0.506* 0.465   0.920*** 0.996***   1.900*** 2.213***   0.732*** 0.699*** 
  (2.07) (0.87)   (4.15) (3.11)   (3.76) (2.82)   (1.00) (0.00)   (1.69) (1.34)   (2.84) (2.64)   (2.92) (2.81)   (3.39) (2.74) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.714 -1.787   -1.725 -1.790   -1.696 -1.796   -1.642 -1.712   2.060 2.172   2.063 2.168   2.031 2.174   2.054 2.155 
#Obs 71087 59524   71087 59524   71087 59524   69368 58176   67436 56908   67436 56908   67436 56908   65527 55402 
Adj R-Sq 0.0061 0.0197   0.0075 0.0214   0.0078 0.0203   0.0048 0.0194   0.0174 0.0441   0.0180 0.0449   0.0207 0.0462   0.0170 0.0441 
Panel E: No Options Firms Interacted with Bad Times 
BadTimes -0.734*** -0.754***   -0.915*** -1.044***   -0.897*** -0.790***   -0.290*** -0.375***   0.395*** 0.406***   0.498*** 0.571***   0.677*** 0.498***   0.030 0.111* 
  (7.57) (7.10)   (8.83) (9.44)   (9.00) (6.90)   (4.52) (5.46)   (4.12) (3.45)   (4.74) (4.30)   (6.66) (4.13)   (0.54) (1.81) 
NoOptions -0.386*** 0.420***   -0.366*** 0.476***   -0.396*** 0.435***   -0.369*** 0.367**   1.091*** -0.160   1.050*** -0.229   1.006*** -0.309**   1.022*** -0.228 
  (3.63) (3.15)   (3.29) (3.44)   (3.55) (3.11)   (3.22) (2.53)   (8.15) (0.97)   (8.05) (1.43)   (9.96) (2.49)   (6.61) (1.18) 
BadTimes×NoOptions -0.944* -0.742   -2.028*** -2.120***   -0.987** -0.716   -0.414 -0.108   0.609* 0.508   1.516*** 1.699***   1.738** 1.994*   0.410 0.442 
  (1.82) (1.15)   (3.72) (3.28)   (2.20) (1.41)   (1.44) (0.32)   (1.70) (1.21)   (3.56) (3.36)   (1.96) (1.75)   (1.60) (1.44) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.861 -1.957   -1.860 -1.945   -1.836 -1.949   -1.862 -1.931 
 
2.245 2.363   2.241 2.353   2.210 2.353   2.297 2.387 
#Obs 63540 52969   63540 52969   63540 52969   61821 51621  60619 50964   60619 50964   60619 50964   58710 49458 
Adj R-Sq 0.0027 0.0201   0.0041 0.0221   0.0035 0.0202   0.0012 0.0193   0.0046 0.0465   0.0054 0.0476   0.0068 0.0480   0.0039 0.0457 
Panel F: Low Coverage Firms Interacted with Bad Times 
BadTimes -0.894*** -0.926***   -1.047*** -1.176***   -0.961*** -0.848***   -0.478*** -0.547***   0.645*** 0.718***   0.764*** 0.909***   0.823*** 0.708***   0.245*** 0.357*** 
  (8.86) (8.36)   (9.61) (9.96)   (9.34) (7.33)   (7.55) (8.16)   (6.65) (6.28)   (7.24) (7.05)   (8.02) (6.09)   (4.36) (5.97) 
LowCoverage -0.579*** -0.081   -0.581*** -0.031   -0.452** 0.070   -0.483** -0.208   1.089*** 0.235   1.077*** 0.230   1.058*** 0.296   0.879*** 0.063 
  (2.69) (0.32)   (2.74) (0.12)   (2.12) (0.27)   (1.99) (0.74)   (5.84) (1.00)   (5.84) (0.99)   (5.83) (1.27)   (4.20) (0.24) 
BadTimes×LowCoverage -0.925 -1.310   -1.195 -2.050**   -1.929** -2.285***   -0.687 -0.366   0.446 1.282**   0.637 1.531***   0.877 1.074*   0.826** 1.138** 
  (1.23) (1.45)   (1.38) (1.98)   (2.56) (2.61)   (1.43) (0.60)   (0.89) (2.26)   (1.20) (2.64)   (1.52) (1.84)   (2.15) (2.45) 
Good Times Ŷ -1.621 -1.697   -1.626 -1.694   -1.609 -1.704   -1.563 -1.622 
 
1.903 1.984   1.902 1.979   1.884 1.989   1.899 1.952 
#Obs 61280 51950   61280 51950   61280 51950   59869 50831  59384 50527   59384 50527   59384 50527   57814 49264 
Adj R-Sq 0.0032 0.0220   0.0037 0.0232   0.0042 0.0220   0.0020 0.0213   0.0034 0.0460   0.0038 0.0469   0.0045 0.0456   0.0024 0.0446 
Controls, Ind. F.E. No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes 
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Table IX 
Analyst Attrition in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate probits of analyst attrition for the recommendations sample (1993 to 2014). Variables are averaged 
within each analyst-year. Disappear equals one when the analyst makes no recommendation in I/B/E/S in the next year. Bad 
times measures are as follows. Crisis: September to November 1987 (1987 crisis), August to December 1998 (LTCM), and July 
2007 to March 2009 (Credit Crisis). Recession (NBER recessions): July 1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001, and 
December 2007 to June 2009. High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over the period 1983 to 2014) of the Baker, Bloom, 
and Davis (2016) uncertainty index. Definitions of control variables included here are in Table III. A new control variable Rec 
Influ Prob is the fraction of influential recommendation changes made by the analyst that year. z-statistics (in absolute values and 
based on standard errors clustered by analyst) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Recommendations Sample, Disappear from I/B/E/S Next Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Crisis 0.008* 0.010**             
  (1.81) (2.18)             
Credit Crisis     0.034*** 0.037***         
      (6.11) (6.38)         
Recession         0.042*** 0.034***     
          (8.67) (6.78)     
High Uncertainty             0.026*** 0.028*** 
              (5.20) (5.65) 
Rec Influ Prob -0.030*** -0.020** -0.030*** -0.020** -0.032*** -0.023*** 0.009 0.019 
  (3.34) (2.18) (3.52) (2.27) (3.61) (2.62) (0.47) (1.05) 
Crisis×Rec Influ Prob -0.034** -0.034**             
  (2.01) (1.97)             
Credit Crisis×Rec Influ Prob     -0.055*** -0.056***         
      (2.93) (2.91)         
Recession×Rec Influ Prob         -0.037** -0.029     
          (2.14) (1.62)     
High Uncertainty×Rec Influ Prob           -0.058*** -0.058*** 
              (2.88) (2.90) 
LFR   -0.000   -0.000   -0.001   -0.000 
    (0.67)   (0.73)   (0.92)   (0.75) 
Relative Experience   -0.000**   -0.000**   -0.000**   -0.000** 
    (2.14)   (2.27)   (2.24)   (2.43) 
Log Broker Size   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.013***   -0.012*** 
    (6.80)   (6.78)   (7.09)   (6.95) 
Log Size   -0.003**   -0.003**   -0.004***   -0.004*** 
    (2.40)   (2.56)   (2.97)   (3.03) 
Log BM   -0.008***   -0.007**   -0.006**   -0.009*** 
    (2.71)   (2.35)   (2.13)   (3.25) 
Momentum   -0.024***   -0.023***   -0.025***   -0.024*** 
    (5.58)   (5.40)   (5.93)   (5.66) 
Stock Volatility   0.895***   0.973***   0.782***   0.819*** 
    (7.65)   (8.20)   (6.83)   (7.14) 
Predicted Prob.  0.128 0.114 0.128 0.114 0.127 0.114 0.128 0.114 
#Obs 38546 35508 38546 35508 38546 35508 38546 35508 
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Table X 
Panel Regression of Analyst Activity in Bad Times 
In this table we estimate the effect of bad times on analyst forecast activity (log of one plus the number of forecasts an analyst 
makes per firm-quarter) controlling for firm, analyst, and forecast characteristics. We define the starting and ending quarter of 
coverage using the first and last one-quarter-ahead forecast of the analyst-firm-broker combination. We then count the number of 
quarterly earnings forecasts that the analyst makes for each calendar quarter. Bad times measures equal one whenever any month 
in the quarter is defined as bad times according to the relevant measure: Crisis: September to November 1987 (1987 crisis), 
August to December 1998 (LTCM), and July 2007 to March 2009 (Credit Crisis). Recession (NBER recessions): July 1990 to 
March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 2009. High Uncertainty represents the highest tercile (over 
the period 1983 to 2014) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) uncertainty index. Analyst and forecast characteristics (variables 
described in Table VII) are the averages within the analyst-firm-quarter. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard 
errors clustered by industry-quarter) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) use the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Variable Dependent Variable: Log (1+#Forecasts Per Firm-Quarter) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Crisis 0.063*** 0.067***             
  (6.34) (10.27)             
Credit Crisis     0.094*** 0.082***         
      (8.11) (10.75)         
Recession         0.069*** 0.069***     
          (8.21) (11.74)     
High Uncertainty             0.048*** 0.030*** 
              (7.92) (7.16) 
Optimistic Forecast   0.011***   0.011***   0.011***   0.011*** 
    (8.82)   (8.78)   (8.91)   (8.74) 
LFR   0.002***   0.002***   0.002***   0.003*** 
    (11.27)   (11.01)   (11.11)   (12.41) 
Star Analyst   -0.028***   -0.027***   -0.029***   -0.028*** 
    (13.72)   (13.47)   (13.98)   (13.25) 
Relative Experience   0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   0.000*** 
    (5.08)   (5.01)   (5.15)   (5.78) 
Accuracy Quintile   0.028***   0.028***   0.029***   0.028*** 
    (25.97)   (25.95)   (26.23)   (25.69) 
Log Days to Annc   -0.019***   -0.020***   -0.019***   -0.020*** 
    (9.45)   (9.63)   (9.12)   (9.70) 
Mutiple Forecast Day   -0.038***   -0.038***   -0.038***   -0.038*** 
    (21.02)   (21.35)   (21.25)   (20.30) 
Log Broker Size   0.037***   0.037***   0.037***   0.037*** 
    (39.39)   (39.31)   (39.23)   (38.39) 
Log # Analysts   0.261***   0.260***   0.259***   0.258*** 
    (61.69)   (61.77)   (62.16)   (58.63) 
Log Size   -0.039***   -0.038***   -0.038***   -0.039*** 
    (32.33)   (32.31)   (32.44)   (31.81) 
Log BM   0.008***   0.008***   0.009***   0.005*** 
    (5.45)   (5.23)   (6.68)   (3.15) 
Momentum   -0.004*   -0.003   -0.001   -0.007*** 
    (1.81)   (1.57)   (0.53)   (3.08) 
Dispersion   0.018***   0.018***   0.017***   0.019*** 
    (12.72)   (12.72)   (12.75)   (12.49) 
Intercept  0.642*** 0.497*** 0.641*** 0.500*** 0.639*** 0.492*** 0.619*** 0.501*** 
  (194.02) (28.80) (198.10) (29.08) (189.89) (28.46) (157.11) (28.86) 
Good Times Ŷ 0.642 0.680 0.641 0.680 0.639 0.678 0.619 0.667 
#Obs 1916213 1250891 1916213 1250891 1916213 1250891 1850104 1201285 
Adj R-Sq 0.0021 0.1001 0.0037 0.1006 0.0031 0.1007 0.0035 0.0981 
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Table XI 
Analyst Report Length in Bad Times 
The list of all U.S. analyst company reports issued by Morgan Stanley from 1994 to 2014 is downloaded from Thomson ONE 
(until September 2011) and Thomson Eikon (from October 2011 onwards) and the number of pages in each report is regressed 
against a bad times dummy and control variables. Bad times measures are defined in Table I. Beta is the stock’s market beta 
based on three years of past monthly returns. Size Quintile is based on the stock’s market cap in the prior June using NYSE 
breakpoints. Momentum Quintile is based on the month t–12 to t–2 buy-and-hold stock return sorted in month t–1. BM Quintile is 
based on the firm’s book-to-market ratio. Stock Volatility is the month t–1 volatility of daily stock returns. Earnings Annc 
Dummy (Guidance Dummy) indicates that the analyst report is issued within three trading days of an earnings announcement 
(earnings guidance). Earnings announcement dates are from Compustat and guidance dates are from First Call Guidelines and 
I/B/E/S Guidance. t-statistics (in absolute values and based on standard errors clustered by the date of the analyst report) are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Industry fixed effects (F.E.) 
use the Fama and French (1997) 30-industry classification. 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Number of Pages in an Analyst Report 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Crisis 1.336*** 1.552***             
  (8.84) (9.99)             
Credit Crisis     1.916*** 1.991***         
      (13.21) (12.34)         
Recession         -0.928*** -0.098     
          (5.80) (0.62)     
High Uncertainty             1.429*** 1.356*** 
              (13.61) (14.35) 
Beta   0.386***   0.379***   0.389***   0.396*** 
    (10.41)   (10.24)   (10.37)   (10.35) 
Size Quintile   0.091***   0.094***   0.086***   0.100*** 
    (3.68)   (3.79)   (3.43)   (3.94) 
Momentum Quintile   -0.172***   -0.171***   -0.150***   -0.152*** 
    (7.92)   (7.89)   (6.81)   (6.86) 
BM Quintile   0.072***   0.071***   0.077***   0.093*** 
    (3.14)   (3.08)   (3.34)   (3.94) 
Stock Volatility   -68.509***   -68.194***   -66.087***   -66.818*** 
    (26.86)   (26.96)   (24.67)   (26.31) 
Earnings Annc Dummy   -0.068   -0.101   -0.023   0.026 
    (0.77)   (1.13)   (0.26)   (0.29) 
Guidance Dummy   0.644***   0.636***   0.644***   0.501*** 
    (8.97)   (8.89)   (8.87)   (6.93) 
Intercept 10.237*** 11.305*** 10.215*** 11.296*** 10.433*** 11.292*** 9.678*** 10.626*** 
  (178.98) (66.07) (179.86) (66.18) (182.87) (65.83) (122.69) (58.01) 
Good Times Ŷ 10.237 10.220 10.215 10.208 10.433 10.345 9.678 9.706 
#Obs 85525 84707 85525 84707 85525 84707 81583 80806 
Adj R-Sq 0.0024 0.0552 0.0043 0.0566 0.0015 0.0520 0.0097 0.0624 
Industry F.E. No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  
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Panel A: Downgrades 
 
Panel B: Upgrades 
 
Figure 1. Impact of recommendation changes in bad times. This figure plots the mean two-day CAR and the influential probability of recommendation changes 
(in percent). Panel A shows downgrades and Panel B shows upgrades. The benchmark return for the CAR is the return from a characteristics-matched DGTW portfolio. The 
sample is from 1993 to 2014. A recommendation change is defined as the analyst’s current rating minus their prior outstanding rating (initiations and reiterations are excluded); 
changes made around earnings announcement and guidance days, and changes on multiple-recommendation days, are excluded. Influential changes are those whose two-day CAR 
is in the same direction as the recommendation change and is 1.96 times larger than expected based on the prior three-month idiosyncratic volatility of the stock (following Loh 
and Stulz (2011)). Bad times measures are as follows. Crisis: September to November 1987 (1987 crisis), August to December 1998 (LTCM), and July 2007 to March 2009 
(Credit Crisis). Recession (NBER recessions): July 1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 2009. High Uncertainty represents the highest 
tercile (over the period 1983 to 2014) of the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) uncertainty index. 
